Question

so? Conn.A 61 A.2d 1016 (2009)] 1-8. Jur Nisco Michelle Fleshner worked for Pepose Vision Ins e (PVI), a surgical practice. She was fired after she provided information to the Department of Labor about PVI's overtime pay policy. She sued for wrong- ful termination, and the jury awarded her $125,000. After the trial, a juror told PVI's attorneys that another juror had made anti-Semitic statements during jury delibera- tions. The comments concerned a witness who testified on PVI's behalf. According to the juror, the other juror said, about the witness: "She is a Jewish witch." "She is a penny-pinching Jew." “She was such a cheap Jew that she did not want to pay Plaintiff unemployment compensa- tion." Another juror confirmed the remarks. PVI filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. The trial judge held that the comments did not prevent a fair trial from occurring. PVI appealed. Do you think such comments are sufficient to require a new trial, or must a juror's bias be discovered during voir dire for it to matter? Explain. [Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2010)] inv th: an ac Se it p. SI (b) V 3-10. res Go to nd Cal.A Pro ity 54 a ques (a) to 00 all (b) and and ped iled ued, the (c) 3-9. A QUESTION OF ETHICS: Service of Process. Narnia Investments, Ltd., filed a suit in a Texas state court against several defendants, including Harvestons Securities, Inc., a securities dealer. (Securities are documents evidencing the ownership ADEARCHA (d ourt The H to The CI14 Is for trial n its LEGAL RESEARCH EXERCISES Go to this text's Web site at www.cengage "Practical Internet Exercises." There you wil you can perform to learn more about the topics covereč oN Dndical Internet Exercise 3-1: Legal Perspective u Duoceduure EGAL

We supposed to answer this way.

1. Issue
2. Rule
3. Analysis
4. Conclusion

but I don't have any idea how to do it can you help. I already have a headache. ?

Answer 1

1.Issue

Michelle Fleshner sued her former employer, Pepose Vision Institute, P.C. (“PVI”), for damages resulting from its wrongful termination of her. A jury found PVI liable on Fleshner's claim and awarded her $30,000 in actual damages and $95,000 in punitive damages. This Court granted transfer after disposition by the court of appeals. Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution.

Among its allegations of error, PVI claims that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on its motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. PVI contends that one juror's anti-Semitic comments about a defence witness deprived it of a jury of 12 fair and impartial jurors. This Court finds that if a juror makes statements evincing ethnic or religious bias or prejudice during jury deliberations, the parties are deprived of their right to a fair and impartial jury and equal protection of the law. Accordingly, the trial court should have held a hearing to determine whether the alleged anti-Semitic comments were made. PVI contended in its motions for new trial that, as a result of the anti-Semitic comments, it was deprived of its due process rights and did not receive a fair trial. The trial court's refusal to give PVI's proposed limiting instruction is not an abuse of discretion.

2.Rule

This Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct unless the trial court abused its discretion.A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling “is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration."

The general rule in Missouri, referred to as the Mansfield Rule, is that a juror's testimony about jury misconduct allegedly affecting deliberations may not be used to impeach the jury's verdict. Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Mo. banc 2008). “A juror who has reached his conclusions on the basis of evidence presented for his consideration may not have his mental processes and innermost thoughts put on a slide for examination under the judicial microscope.” Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341, 348 (Mo .1967). In other words, juror testimony is improper if it merely alleges that jurors acted on improper motives, reasoning, beliefs, or mental operations, also known as “matters inherent in the verdict.”⁴ Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo.App.1996). There are two major policy considerations for this rule. First, there would be no end to litigation if verdicts could be set aside because one juror reportedly did not correctly understand the law or accurately weigh the evidence. Baumle, 420 S.W.2d at 348. Second, there is no legitimate way to corroborate or refute the mental process of a particular juror. Over the years, an exception to the rule prohibiting juror testimony has been adopted. Jurors may testify about juror misconduct occurring outside the courtroom. Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. banc 2002). This exception has been used to allow jurors to testify as to whether they gathered evidence independent to that presented at trial. See id. at 3 (where juror visited accident scene during a trial recess); Middleton v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 152 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Mo.1941) (where juror visited several used car dealerships measuring the type car involved in the accident). When a juror obtains extrinsic evidence, the trial court conducts a hearing to determine whether the extrinsic evidence prejudiced the verdict. See Travis, 66 S.W.3d at 4.

3.Analysis

PVI did not allege juror misconduct occurring outside the courtroom. Instead, PVI asked for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct occurring inside the jury room. PVI alleges that comments made by a juror revealing religious and ethnic bias or prejudice during deliberations prevented it from receiving its constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Those alleged comments, PVI claims, demonstrate it did not receive a trial by a fair and impartial jury.It may be clear that eleven (or a lesser number) of the jurors were not, to any degree, influenced by the improper conduct; yet if it remains reasonably doubtful whether one (or a larger number) was, or was not, influenced, the vice remains and the verdict must be set aside because each juror can rightly agree to the verdict only when guided solely by the instructions of the trial judge and the evidence heard in open court.When a juror makes statements evincing ethnic or religious bias or prejudice during deliberations, the juror exposes his mental processes and innermost thoughts. What used to “rest alone in the juror's breast” has now been exposed to the other jurors. The juror has revealed that he is not fair and impartial. Whether the statements may have had a prejudicial effect on other jurors is not necessary to determine. Such statements evincing ethnic or religious bias or prejudice deny the parties their constitutional rights to a trial by 12 fair and impartial jurors and equal protection of the law.

Accordingly, if a party files a motion for a new trial alleging there were statements reflecting ethnic or religious bias or prejudice made by a juror during deliberations, the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether any such statements occurred. Juror testimony about matters inherent in the verdict should be excluded. See Baumle, 420 S.W.2d at 348. If the trial court finds after conducting a hearing that such biased or prejudicial statements were made during deliberations, then the motion for a new trial should be granted as the parties would have been deprived of their right to a trial by 12 fair and impartial jurors.The ethnicity or religion of any party or witness unrelated to the evidence should have no bearing on the outcome of a trial. To allow the verdict to stand without holding a hearing to determine whether the alleged comments were made undermines public confidence in the justice system. The courts must zealously guard the right to a fair and impartial trial and equal protection under the law.

Perhaps seeing the weakness in its argument for an exclusive causation standard, PVI alternatively argues that this Court should adopt the but-for standard articulated in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1993), and require trial courts to instruct the jury using the causal standard in MAI 19.01, “directly caused or directly contributed to cause.” PVI did not preserve the issue for appeal by submitting it as a proposed jury instruction. See Rule 84.13(a).

4. Conclusion

In overruling PVI's motions, the trial court concluded that jury deliberations are sacrosanct and that the juror's alleged comments did not constitute the kind of jury misconduct that would allow the trial court to set aside the verdict and order a new trial.  Because PVI failed to timely object to this evidence when it was offered at trial, the issue is not preserved for appeal. At the time of her termination, Fleshner asked if PVI would release her from a non-competition agreement, but PVI declined. PVI filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to prohibit Fleshner from working for a general ophthalmology practice. Eventually, Fleshner and PVI entered into a settlement agreement.

The judgement is reversed, and the case is remanded.

All concur.