As per HOMEWORKLIB RULES, in case of multiple questions, only the
first question is to be attempted.
Kindly ask rest of the questions in a separate post.
1.
Correct option: Ultimate Saver $65 and SuperDuper Saver $50
Reason: When SD Saver chooses to increase the size, U Saver will choose to Increase
When SD Saver chooses to not increase the size, U Saver will choose to Increase
Thus, it is dominant strategy for U Saver to increase the size
Similarly,
When U Saver chooses to increase the size, SD Saver will choose to Increase
When U Saver chooses to increase the size, SD Saver will choose to Increase
Thus, it is dominant strategy for SD Saver to increase the size
Thus, Nash equilibrium: (SD increase, U increase) = (50,65)
Closest option would be B
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