Let x be the monetary value in $1000. Let u(x) indicate the utility of having $x (in thousands) (Here we are assuming that the monetary values are dollars although the question does not specify it)
We will first set the 2 values of the utilities at x=1 as u(x=1)=0 and u(x=10)=1. That is utility of $1k is set at 0 and utility of $10k is set at 1.
We want to fill in the following table, by eliciting responses for x=2,4,6, and 8 (in thousand dollars)
x ($1000) | u(x) |
1 | 0 |
2 | |
4 | |
6 | |
8 | |
10 | 1 |
Hence the utility of $4k for me is 0.60
Hence the utility of $2k for me is 0.30
Hence the utility of $6k for me is 0.76
Hence the utility of $8k for me is 0.844
We get the following table of utilities
x ($1000) | u(x) |
1 | 0 |
2 | 0.3 |
4 | 0.6 |
6 | 0.76 |
8 | 0.844 |
10 | 1 |
We plot this in excel using insert-->scatter--->lines
get the following raw graph
Since this utility is largely concave, this is a utility function for a risk averse person. But it turns up at higher payoffs, indicating a slightly higher risk apatite at higher payoffs.
Here is a question we could ask person n. For what magnitude of are you indifferent...
Please answer Exercises 1
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