ZuoTi.Pro
Question

When I use arbitrary numbers for the payoff function for Player 2, I get 2 NEPS, but am not certain about this approach.

QUESTION5 (5) Consider a game with two players, playerl and player 2. Player 1s strategies are up and down, and player 2s strategies are left and rigbt. Suppose that player 1s payoff function is such that for any combination of the players chosen strategies, player 1 always receives a payoff equal to 0 Suppose further that player 2s payoff function is such that no two combinations of the players chose n strategies ever give player 2 the same payoff. Choose the right answer among the options below. The game has exactly one NEPS The game has exactly two NEPS The game has exactly four NEPS The game has zero NEPS

business   economics   
0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Next > < Previous
Sort answers by oldest

Homework Answers

Answer #1

Consider the game with two players “Player 1” and “Player 2”. Now, “P1” have two strategies “UP” and “DOWN” and “P2” have two strategies “LEFT” and “RIGHT”. Now, we have given that “P1’s” payoff function is such that for any combination of the player’s chosen strategies, “P1” always receive payoff equal to “0” and “P2’s” payoff function is such that no two combination of the player’s chosen strategies ever give “P2” the same payoff, => the payoff matrix is given by.

P1P2 LEFT RIGHT UP DOWN 0, c 0,b 0, d 0, a

Now, if “P1” choses “UP” then “P2” will chose either “LEFT” or “RIGHT” depending on “a” or “b” which one is greater. Similarly, if “P1” choses “DOWN” then “P2” will chose either “LEFT” or “RIGHT” depending on “c” or “d” which one is greater and “P1” will always get “0”, => is completely independent of any strategies. SO, there are exactly “2 pure strategy NE”

So, here “2nd” be the correct answer.

0 0
Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
When I use arbitrary numbers for the payoff function for Player 2, I get 2 NEPS,...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Log In

Sign Up

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions

  • QUESTION 8 Consider a game with two players, players and player 2. Player 1's strategies are...

    QUESTION 8 Consider a game with two players, players and player 2. Player 1's strategies are up and down, and player 2's strategies are left and right. Suppose that player 1's payoff function is such that for any combination of the players chosen strategies, player 1 always receives a payoff equal to 0. Suppose further that player 2's payoff function is such that no two combinations of the players' chosen strategies ever give player 2 the same payoff Choose the...

  • 2. Suppose you know the following about a particular two-player game: S1- A, B, C], S2...

    2. Suppose you know the following about a particular two-player game: S1- A, B, C], S2 (X, Y, Z], uI(A, X) 6, u1(A, Y) 0, and u1(A, Z)-0. In addition, suppose you know that the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which (a) the players select each of their strategies with posi- tive probability, (b) player 1's expected payoff in equilibrium is 4, and (c) player 2's expected payoff in equilibrium is 6. Do you have enough infor- mation...

  • 4. (a) (10%) A player has three information sets in the game tree. He has four...

    4. (a) (10%) A player has three information sets in the game tree. He has four choices in his first information set, four in his second and three in his third. How many strategies does he have in the strategic form? Circle one: (i) 11, (ii) 28 (iii) 48 (iv) 18. (b) (10%) Is it true that the following game is a Prisoners' Dilemma? Explain which features of a Prisoners' Dilemma hold and which do not. (Remember each player must...

  • Every time I have plugged in the values, I keep getting only 1 NEPS. I have...

    Every time I have plugged in the values, I keep getting only 1 NEPS. I have done the math twice. 4) Suppose that r is a non-zero real number. In which case does the following game have exactly two NEPS? Player 2 Player 1

  • The following matrix gives the payoff for Player 1 and Player 2 with R and L...

    The following matrix gives the payoff for Player 1 and Player 2 with R and L strategies. Assume that they determine their strategies simultaneously and independently. Player 2 R L R (5, 4) (-1, -1) Player 1 L (-1, -1) (2, 2) (a) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy? Why or why not? What is its dominant strategy, if existing? (b) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy? Why or why not? What is its dominant strategy, if existing?...

  • 5. Consider the payoff matrix below, which shows two players each with three strategies. Player 2...

    5. Consider the payoff matrix below, which shows two players each with three strategies. Player 2 A2 B2 C2 A1 20, 22 24, 20 25, 24 B1 23,26 21,24 22, 23 C1 19, 25 23,17 26,26 Player1 STUDENT NUMBER: SECTION: Page 11 of 12 pages Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this simultaneous choice, one play game. Explain your reasoning. a) b) Draw the game in extended form and solve assuming sequential choice, with player 2 choosing first.

  • Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2...

    Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Strategy X Y Player 1 A 48, 48 -60, 8 B 8, -60 32, 32 a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s),...

  • QUESTION 5 Player III PlayerII Player lI Player i A 11,1 444 A 3,3,0 3,1,7 B...

    QUESTION 5 Player III PlayerII Player lI Player i A 11,1 444 A 3,3,0 3,1,7 B 118 31A Player I B 7,5,7 -1,6,3 Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated twice without discounting. Consider all possible SPNE in pure strategies for the twice repeated game. The highest payoff Player 1 can get in a SPNE is The highest payoff Player 2 can get in a SPNE is . Finally, the highest payoff Player 3 can get in...

  • Each of two players chooses a number '1' or '2' independently from the other player. P1...

    Each of two players chooses a number '1' or '2' independently from the other player. P1 wins if the sum is odd. If the sum is even, p2 wins. The payoff to P1 is P1's number multiplied bt P2's number. Find the matrix of this zero-sum game, the value, and the optimal strategies of the players

  • 3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1...

    3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1 moves twice: Player 1 chooses Enter or Erit, and if she chooses Exit the game ends with payoffs of 2 to player 2 and 0 to player 1. • Player 2 observes player l's choice and will have a choice between Fight or Help if player 1 chose Enter. Choosing Help ends the game with payoffs of 1 to both players. • Finally, player...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT