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Let 0 6 1 and let G(co,6) be the infinitely repeated 6-discounted 2-person game the payoffs of which in each stage are given by Table Table 1: 1-Shot Payoffs LİR U 4,5 0,6 D 5,1 1,2 C. Assume that the stage payoff of player 2 at (D, R) is replaced by an arbitrary payoff a with 1 a5 and nothing else is changed. Compute the smallest discount factor such that there exists a Nash Equilibrium (not necessarily subgame perfect) according to which (U, L) is selected on the equilibrium path in each stage?
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