Question

Riley v. California Case Brief

1． Please provide an analysis of any concurring or dissenting opinions by other members of the Court and also provide your personal opinion of the case. For your personal opinion, tell me whether you agreed with the decision of the Court and why.

2． Please provide the issue or issues in the case being decided by the Court.

3． Please provide the relevant facts for the case. Include, if relevant, all consolidated cases and their importance in the determination of the case.

4． Please provide the final ruling of the Court and the reasons why the Court made the decision that it did.

5． Please provide the history of the case. This means the decisions of the lower courts, both trial and appellate.

Answer 1

Answer:

Outcome

The Supreme Court held in a unanimous decision by Chief Justice Roberts, that police generally require a warrant in order to search cell phones, even when it occurs during an otherwise lawful arrest. The Chief Justice explained that analogizing a search of data on the cell phone to a search of physical items is akin to "saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from Point A to Point B but little else justified lumping them together." The Court also emphasized that "the fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple--get a warrant."

EPIC's amicus brief, joined by twenty-four legal scholars and technical experts from the EPIC Advisory Board, was cited twice in the Court's opinion, on pages 20 and 21 and the Court also adopted other portions of the brief without explicit reference. The Court stated:

Mobile application software on a cell phone, or "apps" offer a range of tools for managing detailed information about all aspects of a person's life. There are apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for shar- ing prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for improving your romantic life. There are popular apps for buying or selling just about anything, and the records of such transactions may be accessible on the phone indefinitely. There are over a million apps available in each of the two major app stores; the phrase "there's an app for that" is now part of the popular lexicon. The average smart phone user has installed 33 apps, which together can form a revealing montage of the user's life. See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amicus Curiae in No. 13-132, p. 9.

To further complicate the scope of the privacy interests at stake, the data a user views on many modern cell phones may not in fact be stored on the device itself. Treating a cell phone as a container whose contents may be searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter. See New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460, n. 4 (1981) (describing a "container" as "any object capable of holding another object"). But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen. That is what cell phones, with increasing frequency, are designed to do by taking advantage of "cloud computing." Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself. Cell phone users often may not know whether particular information is stored on the device or in the cloud, and it generally makes little difference. See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center in No. 13-132, at 12-14, 20. Moreover, the same type of data may be stored locally on the device for one user and in the cloud for another.

Background

This case involves an important Fourth Amendment privacy issue that impacts millions of Americans each year: whether officers can search a suspect's cell phone without a warrant during an arrest. The majority of the more than twelve million arrests each year are for alleged misdemanors, and most individuals arrested are never convicted of any crime. In Riley v. California, the lower court ruled that a police officer can not only seize and secure a suspect's cell phone pursuant to an arrest, they can also search the contents of that phone without any warrant or probable cause.

The Petitioner and Defendant in this case, David Leon Riley, was arrested on August 22, 2009, after a traffic stop resulted in the discovery of loaded firearms in his car. The officers subsequently seized Riley's phone, and searched through his messages, contacts, videos, and photographs. Based in part on the data stored on Riley's phone, the officers charged him with an unrelated shooting that had taken place several weeks prior to his arrest.

Riley moved to suppress all the evidence the officers had obtained during the search of his cell phone on the grounds that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court rejected this argument and held that the search was legitimate incident to arrest. Riley was subsequently convicted. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgement based on the recent California Supreme Court decision, People v. Diaz. In Diaz, the court held that the Fourth Amendment "search-incident-to-arrest" doctrine permits the police to conduct a full exploratory search of a cell phone (even if it is conducted later and at a different location) whenever the phone is found near the suspect at the time of arrest.

The Defendant in Diaz sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court, but while his petition was pending the California Legislature passed a bill requiring police to obtain a warrant before searching the contents of any "portable electronic devices." The Court subsequently denied the petition after the State brought this bill to its attention. But, one week later, the Governor vetoed the bill, stating that "courts are better suited" to decide this issue of Fourth Amendment law.

There is currently a split among state and federal courts over the cell phone search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have ruled that officers can search cell phones incident to arrest under various standards, and that rule has been followed by the Supreme Courts of Georgia, Massachusetts, and California. Other courts in the First Circuit and the Supreme Courts of Florida and Ohio have disagreed.

The Search Incident to Arrest Exception

The Supreme Court first outlined the search-incident-to-arrest exception in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), holding that police may search a suspect's person and the immediate vicinity during a lawful arrest. This exception serves two governmental interests: (1) the need to ensure officer safety and disarm the suspect and (2) the need to prevent destruction of evidence. But, as the Court stressed in a recent case, when "there is no possibility" that the suspect could gain access to a weapon or destroy evidence "both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009). The basic rule under the Fourth Amendment is that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable." Id. at 338.

Petitioner Riley's Brief

In his opening brief, Riley argued that the search of his cell phone was not justified under the Chimel exception because it was not necessary to serve any legitimate government interest. Specifically, the device did not threaten officer safety, and searching it after it had already been seized was not necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. Riley also argued that the search of his cell phone was unreasonably intrusive given the extraordinary amount of sensitive personal information stored on the phone, and the First Amendment implications of the government's collection of those communications. Petitioner also argued that it would not be sufficient for the Court to establish a rule limiting the cell phone search to situations where the officer believes the phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest. Finally, Riley argued that the search of his cell phone at the police stationhouse was too remote from his arrest to be justified under the exception.

. EPIC's Interest in Riley v. California

EPIC has an interest in upholding Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. In particular, EPIC is focused on preventing the erosion of constitutional privacy rights due to the emergence of new technologies. Cell phone privacy is of critical concern to all Americans, as sensitive private data is now routinely stored and accessed via Internet-enabled smartphones. This data is intensely private and can reveal intimate details including sensitive communications, photos and videos, financial data, health records, and even confidential documents stored on remote servers. Phones also provide access to communications and records of third parties, whose privacy interests are also implicated.

EPIC previously outlined the importance of minimizing data subject to law enforcement search and seizure in its amicus curiae brief in City of Ontario, Ca v. Quon. Specifically, EPIC recommended that the Supreme Court adopt the data minimization principles outlined by the Ninth Circuit in Comprehensive Drug Testing v. United States, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009). EPIC seeks to ensure that the amount of individualized private data collected and stored by the government is minimized and subject to rigorous privacy protections. Giving police the power to store the vast amount of information available from cellphones poses numerous privacy concerns in terms of data retention, security breaches, and mission creep.

Relevant Precedent

• Supreme Court and Appellate Court Cases
  • United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
• Lower Courts Allowing Warrantless Cell Phone Searches
  • Fifth Circuit
    • United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007)
  • Fourth Circuit
    • United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009)
  • Seventh Circuit
    • United States v. Florez-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012)
  • California Supreme Court
    • People v. Diaz, 51 Cal.4th 84 (Cal. 2011)
  • Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210 (Mass. 2012)
  • Georgia Supreme Court
    • Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. 2012)
• Lower Courts Not Allowing Warrantless Cell Phone Searches
  • First Circuit
    • United States v. Wurie, No. 11-1792, 2013 WL 2129119 (1st Cir. 2013)
  • Florida Supreme Court
    • Smallwood v. State, No. SC11-1130, 2013 WL 1830961 (Fla. 2013).
  • Ohio Supreme Court
    • State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009)

Other review:

Riley v. California

Docket No.	Op. Below	Argument	Opinion	Vote	Author	Term
13-132	Cal.	Apr 29, 2014 Tr.Aud.	Jun 25, 2014	9-0	Roberts	OT 2013

Disclosure: Disclosure: Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, was among the counsel to the petitioner in this case at the certiorari stage through the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, but it is not participating in the case at the merits stage.

Holding: The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cellphone seized from an individual who has been arrested.

Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 9-0, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts on June 25, 2014. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

SCOTUSblog Coverage

• Symposium: In Riley v. California, a unanimous Supreme Court sets out Fourth Amendment for digital age (Marc Rotenberg and Alan Butler)
• Symposium: The Court starts to catch up with technology (Mason Clutter)
• Symposium: Inaugurating the digital Fourth Amendment (Richard M. Re)
• Symposium: Surprising unanimity, even more surprising clarity (Adam Gershowitz)
• Symposium: A whole lot of Wurie: Information acquisition and the Fourth Amendment (Anthony Barkow Eric Del Pozo)
• Get a warrant! Today's cellphone privacy decision in Plain English (Amy Howe)
• Opinion analysis: Broad cloak of privacy for cellphones (Lyle Denniston)
• A whole new world: Today’s oral arguments in Plain English (Amy Howe)
• Argument analysis: Limiting a search? Sure, but how? (Lyle Denniston)
• SCOTUS for law students (sponsored by Bloomberg Law): Searching cellphones (Stephen Wermiel)
• Argument preview: Police and cellphone privacy (Lyle Denniston)
• Court to rule on cellphone privacy (Lyle Denniston)
• Petition of the day (Mary Pat Dwyer)

Date	Proceedings and Orders (key to color coding)
Jul 30 2013	Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due August 30, 2013)
Aug 12 2013	Waiver of right of respondent California to respond filed.
Aug 15 2013	Consent to the filing of amicus curae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the petitioner.
Aug 21 2013	DISTRIBUTED for Conference of September 30, 2013.
Aug 30 2013	Brief amici curiae of Center for Democracy & Technology and Electronic Frontier Foundation filed. (Distributed)
Aug 30 2013	Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed.
Aug 30 2013	Brief amicus curiae of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed.
Sep 3 2013	Response Requested . (Due October 3, 2013)
Sep 27 2013	Brief of respondent California in opposition filed.
Oct 16 2013	Reply of petitioner David Leon Riley filed.
Nov 20 2013	DISTRIBUTED for Conference of December 6, 2013.
Dec 3 2013	Record Requested .
Dec 23 2013	Record received. California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District and San Diego Superior Court (1 box)
Dec 31 2013	DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 17, 2014.
Jan 17 2014	Petition GRANTED limited to the following question: Whether evidence admitted at petitioner's trial was obtained in a search of petitioner's cell phone that violated petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.
Feb 11 2014	SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday, April 29, 2014
Feb 18 2014	Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the petitioner.
Feb 19 2014	Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, rece8ved from counsel for the respondent.
Mar 3 2014	Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed.)
Mar 3 2014	Brief of petitioner David Leon Riley filed.
Mar 7 2014	Brief amici curiae of Criminal Law Professors in support of private parties filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 7 2014	Brief amici curiae of American Civil Liberties Union, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	CIRCULATED.
Mar 10 2014	Brief amici curiae of American Library Assciation, and The Internet Archive in support of Riley and Wurie filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center in support of Riley and Wurie filed. VIDED.
Mar 10 2014	Brief amici curiae of Center for Democracy & Technology, and Electronic Frontier Foundation in support of Riley and Wurie filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	Brief amicus curiae of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	Brief amicus curiae of DKT Liberty Project filed. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	Brief amici curiae of Electronic Privacy Information Center, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	Brief amici curiae of National Press Photographers Association, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	Brief amici curiae of Professors Charles E. MacLean & Adam Lamparello filed. (Distributed)
Mar 10 2014	Brief amicus curiae of The Cato Institute filed. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2014	Brief of respondent California filed. (Distributed)
Apr 9 2014	Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. (Distributed)
Apr 9 2014	Brief amici curiae of Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Apr 9 2014	Brief amici curiae of Arizona, et al. filed. (Reprinted) (Distributed)
Apr 10 2014	Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument filed.
Apr 18 2014	Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument GRANTED.
Apr 22 2014	Reply of petitioner David Leon Riley filed. (Distributed)
Apr 29 2014	Argued. For petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For respondent: Edward C. DuMont, Solicitor General, San Francisco, Cal.; and Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
Jun 25 2014	Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. VIDED with No. 13-212.
Jul 28 2014	MANDATE ISSUED.
Jul 28 2014	Record returned for Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.