a.The utility function is increasing in income. Rawlsian social welfare is therefore equal to the utility of the individual with lower income. For 0% and 25% tax rates, Ted has the lower incomes ($120 and $320, respectively). For a 40% tax rate, Bill has the lower in-come ($240). Since $320 > $240 > $120, Rawlsian social welfare is highest under the 25% tax rate and lowest under the 40% tax rate. To compute utilitarian social welfare, we compare:
Utilitarian social welfare with a 0% tax = 1,0001/2 + 1201/2≈42.58
Utilitarian social welfare with a 25% tax = 6001/2 + 3201/2 ≈42.38
Utilitarian social welfare with a 40% tax = 2401/2 + 2801/2≈32.33
We see that the 0% tax rate is best.
b. This change does not affect the order of tax rates according to the Rawlsian social welfare function. To compute social welfare for the utilitarian social welfare function we compare:
utilitarian social welfare with 0% tax = (1000)1/5 + 1201/5≈6.59.
utilitarian social welfare with 25% tax = 6001/5 + 3201/5 ≈6.76.
utilitarian social welfare with 40% tax = 2401/5 + 2801/5≈6.08.
We see that the 25% tax rate is best and the 40% tax rate is the worst.
c.
Since the two have different utility functions, it is no longer easy to see who is better off under each situation. Under the 0% tax policy, we see that Ted has utility 1201/2≈10.95 and Bill has utility 1,0001/2 / 4 ≈7.91.
We see that Bill is worse off under this policy
Since the other two tax policies make Bill worse off and Ted better off than the 0% policy,Bill’s utility will be used to compute Rawlsian social welfare. Rawlsian social welfare is highest with 0% taxes and lowest with 50% taxes, the policies that make Bill the best and worst off, respectively.
13. Consider HBill and Ted, the two citizens in the from Chapter 1. Suppose that Bill...
9. The country of Adventureland has two citizens, Bill and Ted. Bll has a private legal business. He earns $50 per hour. At a tax rate of 0%, Bill works 20 hours. At a 25% tax rate, he works only 16 hours, and at a 40% tax rate, he works only 8 hours per week. Ted works in a manufacturing job. He works 20 hours per week and earns $6 per government is considering imposing an income tax of either...
7. The country of Tinyland has two citizens, Bill and Ted. Bill owns a business. He earns $50 per hour. When no tax, Bill works 20 hours. At a 25% tax rate he works 16 hours, and at a 40% tax rate he works only 8 hours per week. Ted has a manufacturing job. He works 20 hours per week and earns $6 per hour, regardless of the tax rate. The government is considering imposing an income tax of either...
2. Consider two citizens, Bill and Ted, who live in the fictional country of "Econoland". Bill works as a lawyer and eams $50 per hour. Ted works at Meijer and earns $6 per hour. Both Bill and Ted have identical utility functions equal tou=y"(which is the same as U=JT)where yìs take-home pay (which also equals consumption, if neither Bill nor Ted save). The govemment of Econoland is concemed about i President of Econoland wants you to evaluate three policy options...
Home Tools homework1.pdfx Sign In 212 d Share 95% 7. The country of Tinyland has two citizens, Bill and Ted. Bill owns a business. He earns $50 per hour. When no tax, Bl works 20 hours. At a 25% tax rate he works 16 hours, and at a 40% tax rate he works only 8 hours per week Ted has a manufacturing job. He works 20 hours per week and earns S6 per hour regardless of the tax rate. The...
4. What is the optimal income distribution between two citizens under these three assumptions: -The Social Welfare Function is Utilitarian. - The total income is fixed. - The two citizens have the same individual utility function, which exhibits decreasing but positive marginal utility of income. What are the implications of this result and why we do not see policies to enforce this degree of income distribution in the real world? Justify your answer mentioning one or more of the three...
I consider an economy with two individuals (1 and 2). A, B, and C are three points that belong to the utility possibility frontier of the economy. The individual utilities (Ul. U2) at the three points are as follows: Pointsul U2 A 4 21 B 8 17 C 14 6 Now consider point D. Pointul U2 D 9 15 a. Does point D lie on the utility possibility frontier? How does the answer change if you know the utility possibility...
2. Consider an economy with three individuals who are identical except for their income: individual 1 has one dollars, individual 2 has two dollars, and individual 3 has three dollars. Let the monetary utility function be U x1/2, where x is the income. If you are a social planner who use a utilitarian social welfare function (see Chapter 2, p55 for a definition) to measure social welfare, will you allow individual 1 to steal one dollar from individual 3?