Consider a market in which consumer type x is uniformly
distributed on the unit interval. Consumers demand 0 or 1 unit
(they buy at most one unit overall in the market). Firm A is
located at 0 and firm B at 1. Firms incur constant marginal costs of
production c = 1/2. There is mass 1 of consumers. A consumer
located at x ∈ [0;1] obtains utility ux = r−x−pA if she buys from
firm A; ux = r−(1−x)−pB if she buys from firm B; and 0 if she does
not buy. If more than one firm is present, firms simultaneously set
prices.
(a) Consider the monopoly problem in which only firm A is present
and sets its prices to maximize profits. Calculate the monopoly
solution depending on r where r ∈ [0;4]. (b) Consider the duopoly
problem in which firms compete in prices. Solve for Nash equilibrium
depending on r. [Note: Be careful, make sure that you characterize
the equilibrium for any parameter r ∈ [0;4].]
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(c) Compare the price level in duopoly to the price level under
monopoly. Are duopoly pricing necessarily lower than monopoly
prices? Explain your findings. (d) Suppose that firm A is the
incumbent and, thus, has already entered the market. Suppose at a
stage prior to the pricesetting stage, firm B decides whether to
enter. To enter the firm has to pay an entry cost K which is sunk.
Depending on r calculate the critical sunk cost ˆ K above which firm
B would not be willing to enter the market.
Consider a market in which consumer type x is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Consumers...
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