Exercise 3 Let us consider a market where 3 firms I = {1, 2, 3} compete...
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Exercise 3
Let us consider a market where 3 firms I = {1, 2, 3} compete...
Let us consider a market where 3 firms I = {1, 2, 3} compete `a la...
Let us consider a market where 3 firms I = {1, 2, 3} compete `a la Cournot (quantity-setting competition). The inverse demand function is given by p(Q) = 300 − 5Q, where Q = q1 + q2 + q3. The cost function is homogeneous and it is C1(q) = C2(q) = C3(q) = 30q. Write explicitly the profit functions of each i ∈ I. Derive best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete à la Bertrand. The demand...
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete à la Bertrand. The demand function is given by q() = 250 - 7p. The cost function is the same for both firms and it is C(q) = 100; for all i E {1,2,3,4} • Write explicitly the demand and profit functions of 1, 2, 3, and 4. • Derive best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the game. (9) = 591, what • If firm 1 find...
hello, please i needed the solution ASAP thank you! Exercise 5 Let us consider a market...
hello, please i needed the solution ASAP thank you!
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete 'a la Bertrand. The demand function is given by q(p) = 250 - 7p. The cost function is the same for both firms and it is C(qi) = 10qi for all i E {1,2,3,4}. • Write explicitly the demand and profit functions of 1, 2, 3, and 4. • Derive best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the game....
Assume there are two firms, 1 and 2, that compete in output, products are homogeneous, and...
Assume there are two firms, 1 and 2, that compete in output, products are homogeneous, and the inverse market demand is p = a – Q, where Q = q1 + q2. Assume that production costs are zero for simplicity. 1. Find the NE (Cournot) price, output, and profits of each firm if this is a static game. 2. Find the SPNE if this is a dynamic game where firm 1 chooses output first. 3. Find the cartel equilibrium to...
1. Consider the following asymmetric version of the Cournot duopoly model. Two firms compete by simultaneously...
1. Consider the following asymmetric version of the Cournot duopoly model. Two firms compete by simultaneously choosing the quantities (q, and q2) they produce. Their products are homogeneous, and market demand is given by p- 260-2Q, where Q-q +q2. Firm 1 has a cost advantage; Firm 1 produces at zero cost, while Firm 2 produces at a constant average cost of 40. (The difference in costs is what makes this an asymmetric game.) a. Derive both firms' profit functions, as...
Exercise 1 Let consider the Cournot game with I = {1, 2}, let the inverse demand...
Exercise 1 Let consider the Cournot game with I = {1, 2}, let the inverse demand function be equal to p(Q) = 250 - 100 (Q = 41 + 2) and the non linear cost function C(q) = 72 + 2q for both firms. Compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Indicate also some collusive outputs. Do the same with I = {1,2,3}. Question 1 Thinks to be the manager of a firm and you are competing in a duopoly à la Bertrand...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the...
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium? e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot...
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete à la Bertrand. The demand function is given by q() = 250 - 7p. The cost function is the same for both firms and it is C(q) = 100; for all i E {1,2,3,4} • Write explicitly the demand and profit functions of 1, 2, 3, and 4. • Derive best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the game. (9) = 591, what • If firm 1 find...
hello, please i needed the solution ASAP thank you!
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete 'a la Bertrand. The demand function is given by q(p) = 250 - 7p. The cost function is the same for both firms and it is C(qi) = 10qi for all i E {1,2,3,4}. • Write explicitly the demand and profit functions of 1, 2, 3, and 4. • Derive best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the game....
1. Consider the following asymmetric version of the Cournot duopoly model. Two firms compete by simultaneously choosing the quantities (q, and q2) they produce. Their products are homogeneous, and market demand is given by p- 260-2Q, where Q-q +q2. Firm 1 has a cost advantage; Firm 1 produces at zero cost, while Firm 2 produces at a constant average cost of 40. (The difference in costs is what makes this an asymmetric game.) a. Derive both firms' profit functions, as...
Exercise 1 Let consider the Cournot game with I = {1, 2}, let the inverse demand function be equal to p(Q) = 250 - 100 (Q = 41 + 2) and the non linear cost function C(q) = 72 + 2q for both firms. Compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Indicate also some collusive outputs. Do the same with I = {1,2,3}. Question 1 Thinks to be the manager of a firm and you are competing in a duopoly à la Bertrand...
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium? e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot...
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