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this is assuming youre taking part in a second price sealed bid auction
c). You are bidding on 2021 Super Bowl tickets on eBay. You hate American football, and have no interest at all in attending.
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  • I would bid below $6000, this is because as i estimated to sell the ticket in $6000 so in order to get profit in it i should had bid below the selling price even there is chances that the price might have been gone higher then expectation , but by chance if the price have gone below the the expectation ,this would give minimum loss which will be what i am expecting.
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