What do models like the barro gordon model imply for the design of central bank institution ?
The Barro-Gordon model depicted the choices policy makers face when creating monetary policy. The incentive for policy-makers to create surprise inflation is shown below:
This temptation of a temporary rise in employment is correlated with the pressure on governments to achieve high results before elections. The problem becomes time-inconsistent with rational expectations and a multi-period model. The optimal policy for government is positive inflation, which agents know and thus set expectations equal to. This demonstrates the optimal result of a binding rule.
The rule vs. discretion debate highlighted the need to constrain government interference, resulting in increasing central bank independence and a focus upon long term horizons. However, rules cannot accommodate all possible events, and have created problems evident in the Thatcher government. The US policy between 1950-66, and 1985-2000 provides evidence that discretionary policy can produce good results. The assumptions of the distinction between only two types of central bankers and perfect control over the price level are deemed unrealistic.
The granting of Central Bank independence within the UK in 1997 could be seen as a response to the impetus within theoretical literature such as Barro-Gordon to do so. Following this, the MPC was said to gain instant credibility with long-tern inflation expectations falling sharply. Empirical findings below support independent central banks’ ability to sustain lower inflation with no output cost. Central banks tend to follow Fischer’s theory of instrument independence and goal dependence. The idea of “constrained discretion” is seen in the UK with the Chancellor’s requirement of a remit letter if inflation strays by 1pp from target. The independence of the UK’s Quantitative easing policy is seen by its status of “the business of the bank” (Mervyn King). However the democratic need for accountability is seen in the UK’s allowance of a member of the treasury to sit in on meetings.
Reputation and delegation are two theoretical commitment solutions to the dynamic-inconsistency problem. (Romer, 2001). Reputation plays a role in monetary policy, in a state of uncertainty such as the UK, where the image of central bankers of inflation fighting is important to establish credibility thus incentivising them to achieve targets. This issue is seen as being “near..to the hearts of real central bankers” (Blinder) and is achieved by processes such as publishing votes.
Commitment solutions rely on the importance of expectations and are prominent in theory and practice of real world policy. This is reflected in the prominent role of the Bank of England’s inflation and output forecasts. However the New Keynesian Phillips Curve assumption that a rise in inflation expectations would give rise to inflation did not hold in recent times, as shown below.
Rogoffs’ proposal of delegating monetary policy to ‘Conservative central bankers’ that are more inflation-averse than the general public provided the “intellectual framework for the redesign of the central banks” (Clement, 2008). It has been influential in the Bank of England’s appointment choices with the Conservative views of insiders dominating monetary policy (Spencer, 2009). The need for the ‘optimal level of conservatism’ explains ‘flexible inflation targets’ in many central banks, and the inclusion of ‘outsiders’ within the MPC. The use of a one-shot game and its exclusion of a disinflation possibility (Hallett, Libich & Stehlik) disconnects it from reality.
Although there is no such inclusion of a ‘performance contract’ (Walsh, 1995) within monetary policy, the theory drew attention to optimal incentive structures for central banks, which is a current focus in the financial crisis literature. The use of an inflation target which allows for output stabilisation, seen in the Svensson model (1997), is correlates with this theory and is evident in most central banks. Svensson proposes an optimal reaction function similar to the Taylor Rule, which the UK’s MPC is said to follow (Spencer 2009). However due its ‘individualistic’ (Blinder) nature consolidated in the ‘one member one vote’ system, one rule could never account for the heterogeneous views within the MPC.
However Harris & Spencer model (2009) state that “the institutional status of Bank of England MPC members” holds more importance than differing reaction functions, The MPC contains five insiders appointed from within the bank, and four outsiders, appointed from other professions and academia. Theory correlates with practice, with insiders more likely to hold conservative views and vote as a block, when compared to outsiders.
The rapid change of the economy in the recent financial crisis has led to a disconnection between theory and practice. The ‘one tool, one target’ approach has proved inadequate in dealing with the financial crisis. Blanchflower (2009) stipulated the exclusion of the financial sector as the reason the Central Bank was slow to realise the severity of the crisis. The effect of the financial crisis confirms the view that theory arises from events, and their unpredictability means models will always contain shortfalls. Shortfalls are also evident in healthy economies. The complete markets assumption seen in such influential models like the DSGE and the ones discussed above does not hold in a world “characterised by herding behaviour & speculative bubbles” (Blanchflower, 2009). Critics cite the inclusion of fiscal policy within models as likely to alter results.
In conclusion, the models I have discussed have been influential in determining the institutional structure of the bank, the type of central banker appointed and how they are done so. They have signified the importance of the role of bank incentives and expectations in forming policy. However as the recent financial crisis has shown, in such a dynamic complicated world littered with uncertainties, generalised models can never satisfy all the demands of practical monetary policy.
What do models like the barro gordon model imply for the design of central bank institution...
In the Barro-Gordon model, what inflation rate would the central bank choose if its most -preferred unemployment rate were equal to the natural rate?
Question 1 Assume that inflation and social welfare are given by r = ne-au- u*) and S=-u-w/212 respectively. We also assume that the expected inflation ne has been set by the time the central bank gets to make its decisions. a) What inflation rate will the central bank pick if they optimize welfare? Show all the steps and discussion analytically. b) If the Central Banks announces that expected inflation ne is going to be 0, does it have incentive to...
What is the primary objective of a central bank? Do you think that the U.S. central bank (the Federal Reserve aka the Fed) has adequately met this objective or do you think that they have overreached their bounds? Why do you believe this? What actions did major central banks around the world take in response to the financial crisis? Was this appropriate response in your opinion? Why or why not?
How the central bank bring polices to get out of the financial crises? like what did the Troika do? please be specific for ireland and europe please write at least one paragraph
Use the IS-LM-PC model with an inflation-targeting central bank to answer the following short answer questions. In this question, you don’t need to explain or show the graph. But, when you’re not sure of the answer, don’t guess; instead, use the IS-LM-PC model to help you. An increase in the risk premium. Inflationary expectations are adaptive. i. What happens to inflation over time? ii. What does the central bank need to do to return to the medium-run equilibrium?
Explain the workings of the classical model. What would the model imply for the economy if there was a) rise in personal savings b)rise in money supply c)rise in government spending financed by borrowing
If a negative real shock occurred in the RBC model, and the central bank increases the money supply, what is the outcome? Will it have any effect on growth in the short run or long run?
What do health policy analysts predict reimbursement models will look like in the future?
Question 5 (20p): Discrete choice models a. What is a binary choice model? What do we eatimate? Discribe the linear, probit and logit models. b. Derive the formula for the probit model for a consumer buying/not buying a product , based on product characteristics. c. In the linear and probit models, how would you calculate the predicted value at the value Xmean d. In estimating the linear binary choice model, what can we say about heteroscedasticity? given estimated coefficients? Provide...
building molecular models
Model 3D shape Molecular Formula Electron Dot Form Central Atom Molecular Geometry of Valence Electron H20 Molecular Formula Central Atom Molecular Geometry Model 3D shape Electron Dot Form # of Valence Electron CHA CH,Cl2 H2O2 NH3 Molecular Formula Central Atom Molecular Geometry Model 3D shape Electron Dot Form # of Valence Electron C₂H₂ CHCI HOCN