Consider the Cournot duopoly model in which two firms, 1 and 2, simul- taneously choose the quantities they supply, q1 and q2. The price each will face is determined by the market demand function (q1, q2) = a − b(q1 + q2). Each firm has a probability μ of having a marginal unit cost of cL, and a probability 1 − μ of having a marginal unit cost of cH, cH > cL. These probabilities are common knowledge, but the true type is revealed only to each firm individually. Solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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Consider the Cournot duopoly model in which two firms, 1 and 2, simul- taneously choose the...
5. Consider a version of the Cournot duopoly game, where firms 1 and 2 simul taneously and independently select quantities to produce in a market. The quantity selected by firm i is denoted q, and must be greater than or equal to zero, for i -1,2. The market price is given by p - 100 - 2q Suppose that each firm produces at a cost of 20 per unit. Further, assume that each firm's payoff is defined as its profit....
Cournot: Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms A and B simultaneously choose quantity. Both firms have constant marginal cost of $20 and zero fixed cost. Market demand is given by: P = 140 − qA − qB. (a) Derive the best-response functions for each firm and plot them on the same graph. (b) Calculate the profits of each firm in the Nash Equilibrium outcome.
Question 5 Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 200 – 2(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $60. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium profit for each firm is _____. Hint: Write your answer to two decimal places. QUESTION 6...
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 300 – 4(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $74. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium profit for each firm is
1. Consider the following asymmetric version of the Cournot duopoly model. Two firms compete by simultaneously choosing the quantities (q, and q2) they produce. Their products are homogeneous, and market demand is given by p- 260-2Q, where Q-q +q2. Firm 1 has a cost advantage; Firm 1 produces at zero cost, while Firm 2 produces at a constant average cost of 40. (The difference in costs is what makes this an asymmetric game.) a. Derive both firms' profit functions, as...
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 200 – 2(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $75. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium quantity produced by each firm is _____. Hint: Write your answer to two decimal places.
3. Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 300 – 4(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $73. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium quantity produced by each firm is _____. Hint: Write your answer to two decimal places.
Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p=210-Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium? The Cournot Equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q1) and Firm 2 (q2) are: q1= __ units and q2 =__ units . (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) The Cournot equilibrium price is p=$__ (two decimal places)
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
1. (25 points) Consider two firms, 1 and 2, producing an identical good simul taneously. This good has market demand given by the demand function y (12 p)/3, where p is price, and y yi y2 is market quantity. yi represents the amount produced by firm i. Suppose production cost is 2yi1 for each firms (a) Solve algebraically for these firms' reaction functions, expressing each firm's optimal output level given the level of its competitor's out- put.(5 pts) (b) Graph...