) TUU 100 2. The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P=20 30...
Question 1 10 pts The (inverse) market demand function in a homogeneous product Cournot duopoly is as follows: P = 200 - 10(Q1+Q2). The total cost functions are TC = 100 + 40Q1 for firm one and TC = 80 + 60Q2 for firm two. 1.(4 points) Determine the reaction function for each firm. 2. (2 points) Calculate each firm's equilibrium level of output. 3. (2 points) Calculate the market equilibrium price. 4.(2 points) Calculate the profit each firm earns...
The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 200 − 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) = 32Q2. If the two oligopolists formed a cartel whose MC is the average between the oligopolists’ marginal costs, find the optimal output, price, and maximized profit. . Assume the cartel splits profit equally among oligopolists.
. A Cournot duopoly with homogeneous products has an inverse demand curve P-400- 5(OA+QB) and costs are CA(QA) 30QA and Ce(Qa)- 40QB. a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output and the market's equilibrium price. c. Calculate the profit each firm carns in equilibrium.
400 1. A Coumot duopoly with homogeneous products has an inverse demand curve P 5(QA + Qo) and costs are Ca(O) - 30QA and C(Qo) - 40 u. a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output and the market's equilibrium price. c. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.
In Cournot duopoly , the inverse demand function is P=150-Q Firm 1 and Firm costs are C1=1000+12q1 and C2=2000+6q2 What is the profit maximization , best reaction function to find Nash equilibrium Price
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 120-2Q. The total cost function for each firm is TC1(Q) = 4Q1. The total cost function for firm 2 is TC2(Q) = 2Q2. What is the output of each firm? Find: Q1 = ? Q2 = ?
Now consider a typical Cournot duopoly situation such that the market is being served by two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) that simultaneously decide on the level of output to sell in the market, while producing an identical product. The total output of the industry is Q = q1 + q2, where q1 and q2 are the output of Firm 1 and 2, respectively. Each firm has a symmetric cost function: C(q1) = 12 q1 and C(q2) = 12...
A homogeneous product duopoly faces a market demand function given by p = 300 - 3Q,where Q = q1 + q2. Both firms have constant marginal cost MC = 100. (part 2) 1a. What is the Bertrand equilibrium price and quantity in this market? 1b. Suppose Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader, what is the equilibrium price in this market if Firm 2 plays the follower in this duopoly market? What is the equilibrium quantity? How much does each firm...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
2. Consider a market with inverse demand P (Q) = 100 - Q. Assume there are two different duopolies serving it. Duopoly D1 has two firms having unit costs c1 = 6 and c2 = 2, and duopoly D2 has two (symmetric) firms both having unit cost c = 4. (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium in each duopoly. (b) Compare the equilibrium total outputs and market prices in the two duopolies. (c) Compare the equilibrium consumer surplus, total firm revenue,...