Homework Answers
If the given simultaneous game is repeated twice and in both periods the same simultaneous game is played. It can be represented in an extensive form where it is a two-stage game and at every stage, a simultaneous game exists. Using backward induction, solving the simultaneous game gives two Nash equilibria; (T,L) and (B,R) and in the first game as well the simultaneous game would yield the same payoffs.
(a) there are two subgames one is a second-period game and other is the whole game.
(b) The SPE are (T,L) and (B,R) in both periods
(c) SPE in which players choose (T,R) in period two will be a punished if deviated with (T,L) chosen in period 1.
(d) SPE in which players choose (B,L) in period two will be punished if deviated with (T,L) chosen in period 1.
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6. The following stage game is played repeatedly for 2 periods. Note that both players observe...
There are two players, i = 1,2. There are also two time periods, te {1,2}. In...
There are two players, i = 1,2. There are also two time periods, te {1,2}. In each period, the following symmetric stage game is played A B C А в с 1,1 0,0 5,0 0,0 3,3 0,0 0,5 0,0 4,4 That is, the players first play this stage game once. Then, after having observed what the rival did in the first round, they play it a second time, after which the overall game is over. Each player maximizes the discounted...
Problem 1: Consider the following simultaneous move game with two players, denoted by 1 and 2: 1 2 T B L 1,0 0,2 M R 0,...
Problem 1: Consider the following simultaneous move game with two players, denoted by 1 and 2: 1 2 T B L 1,0 0,2 M R 0,1 5,0 2,1 1,0 1. Is there a strategy for any of the players which a player would never choose? 2. If there is a strategy which a player never chooses (it is called, a dominated strategy), and this fact is known among the players, find the equilibria of the game. Hint: In a mixed...
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently....
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game A 3,1 4,0 0,1 В 1,5 2,2 0,1 C 1,1 0,2 1,2 (a) (10%) Suppose...
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player...
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player 2 can choose C, D, E, or F (depending on what player 1 chooses). Player 3 can choose G, H, I, J, K, L, M, or N (depending on what player 1 and 2 choose). Player 1 (P1) goes first, player 2 (P2) goes second, and player 3 (P3) goes third. Payoffs are written as the payoffs for P1, P2, and the for P3....
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0, 0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players...
Exercise 6 (Difficult),. Consider the following modification of the prisoner's dilemma game. A-1,...
Exercise 6 (Difficult),. Consider the following modification of the prisoner's dilemma game. A-1,-1-9,0-6,-2 B | 0,-9 |-6-61-5-10 C1-2,-6 |-10,-51-4,-4 You should recognise the payoff's from (A, L), (A, R). (B, L). (B, R) as those in the prisoner's dilemma game studied in class. We added two strategies, one for each player. Also note that strategies A and L are still (when compared to the original prisoner's dilemma game) strictly dominated . What is the set of Nash equilibria of this...
Consider the following normal form game: U D LR 7,7 4,8 8,4 5,5 a. Are there...
Consider the following normal form game: U D LR 7,7 4,8 8,4 5,5 a. Are there dominant actions for any of the players? b. Find all Nash equilibria of this game. c. Suppose we repeat this game 10 times, specify a subgame perfect equi- librium of this finitely repeated game. d. Suppose this game is repeated infinitely: Identify a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game which gives an average (normalized) dis- counted payoff of 7 to both players. Clearly identify...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
8.3 292 Part 3: Uncertainty and Strategy Shov 8.3 The game of Chicken is played by...
8.3
292 Part 3: Uncertainty and Strategy Shov 8.3 The game of Chicken is played by two macho teens who speed branded the chicken, whereas the one who does not veer gains peer- group esteem. Or course, t neither veers, both die of s toward each other on a single-lane road. The first Gan 120 of course, if neither veers, both die iote resulting crash. Payoftis to the Chicken game are provided in the following table. 8.6 The fol Teen...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A while it continues to Bob if she chooses B. Bob then can choose C or D. If he chooses C the game ends, and if he chooses D the game continues to Alice. Finally, Alice can choose E or F and the game ends after each of these choices. a. Present this game as...
There are two players, i = 1,2. There are also two time periods, te {1,2}. In each period, the following symmetric stage game is played A B C А в с 1,1 0,0 5,0 0,0 3,3 0,0 0,5 0,0 4,4 That is, the players first play this stage game once. Then, after having observed what the rival did in the first round, they play it a second time, after which the overall game is over. Each player maximizes the discounted...
Problem 1: Consider the following simultaneous move game with two players, denoted by 1 and 2: 1 2 T B L 1,0 0,2 M R 0,1 5,0 2,1 1,0 1. Is there a strategy for any of the players which a player would never choose? 2. If there is a strategy which a player never chooses (it is called, a dominated strategy), and this fact is known among the players, find the equilibria of the game. Hint: In a mixed...
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game A 3,1 4,0 0,1 В 1,5 2,2 0,1 C 1,1 0,2 1,2 (a) (10%) Suppose...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0, 0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players...
Exercise 6 (Difficult),. Consider the following modification of the prisoner's dilemma game. A-1,-1-9,0-6,-2 B | 0,-9 |-6-61-5-10 C1-2,-6 |-10,-51-4,-4 You should recognise the payoff's from (A, L), (A, R). (B, L). (B, R) as those in the prisoner's dilemma game studied in class. We added two strategies, one for each player. Also note that strategies A and L are still (when compared to the original prisoner's dilemma game) strictly dominated . What is the set of Nash equilibria of this...
Consider the following normal form game: U D LR 7,7 4,8 8,4 5,5 a. Are there dominant actions for any of the players? b. Find all Nash equilibria of this game. c. Suppose we repeat this game 10 times, specify a subgame perfect equi- librium of this finitely repeated game. d. Suppose this game is repeated infinitely: Identify a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game which gives an average (normalized) dis- counted payoff of 7 to both players. Clearly identify...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
8.3
292 Part 3: Uncertainty and Strategy Shov 8.3 The game of Chicken is played by two macho teens who speed branded the chicken, whereas the one who does not veer gains peer- group esteem. Or course, t neither veers, both die of s toward each other on a single-lane road. The first Gan 120 of course, if neither veers, both die iote resulting crash. Payoftis to the Chicken game are provided in the following table. 8.6 The fol Teen...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A while it continues to Bob if she chooses B. Bob then can choose C or D. If he chooses C the game ends, and if he chooses D the game continues to Alice. Finally, Alice can choose E or F and the game ends after each of these choices. a. Present this game as...
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