P=100-2Q where Q is total quantity demanded for both firms 1 and 2, respectively. The firms 1 marginal cost is given by MC1(Q1)=2Q1. The firms 2 marginal cost is given by MC2(Q2)=4Q2. Based on this information firm 1 and firm 2's reaction functions are?
P=100-2Q where Q is total quantity demanded for both firms 1 and 2, respectively. The firms...
P=100-2Q where Q is total quantity demanded for both firms 1 and 2, respectively. The firms 1 marginal cost is given by MC1(Q1)=2Q1. The firms 2 marginal cost is given by MC2(Q2)=4Q2. Based on this information firm 1 and firm 2's reaction functions are?
Please answer me in detail. Thank you. Question 9 Suppose that a monopolist faces a demand curve given by P 120-2Q. A monopolist producing only one product has two plants with the following marginal cost functions: MC1 20+2Q1 and MC2-10+502, where MCi and MC2 are the marginal costs in plants 1 and 2, and Q1 and Q2 are the levels of output in each plant, respectively. (a) Find the monopolist's optimal total output (quantity) and price. b) Find the optimal...
The demand function for an oligopolistic market is given by the equation, Q = 275 – 4P, where Q is quantity demanded and P is price (Note: inverse demand for the dominant firm here is P = 50 - .2Q). The industry has one dominant firm whose marginal cost function is: MC = 12 + 0.7QD, and many small firms, with a total supply function: QS = 25 + P. In equilibrium, the total output of all small firms is
Cournot vs. Stackelberg Oligopoly Suppose the inverse demand function and the cost functions for two duopolists are given by: P = 100 – (Q1 + Q2) C1(Q1) = 2Q1 C2(Q2) = 2Q2 a. Cournot: Assume two Cournot duopolists. i. What is firm 1’s Quantity and Profit? R1 = (100-Q1-Q2) * Q1 R1 = 100Q1 - Q12 - Q2Q1 MR1 = 100 - 2Q1 - Q2 C1(Q1) = 2Q1 MC1 = 2 MR1 = MC1 ii. What is firm 2’s Quantity...
Suppose that the (inverse) market demand function for wax paper is P=400-2Q where Q is total industry output. There are only two firms, Firm1 and Firm 2, that produce wax paper. Thus, Q=q1+q2. Each firm has no fixed cost but a constant marginal cost of production equals $40. (a) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the output quantity for Firm 1 (b) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the profit...
The market demand curve for a pair of duopolists is given as P=100- Q where Q= Q1+ Q2. The constant per unit marginal cost is 0 for firm 1 and c for firm 2 where c is some number. Find the equilibrium price, quantity and profit for each firm in the Bertrand model as a function of c a. Equilibrium price equals P=0. Equilibrium quantity is Q1=Q2=10 with both earning Π1=Π2=0. Which one is correct? ---C= 0 OR C>0 b....
3. A market consists of 100 identical firms and the market demand curve is given by D(P) = 60 - P. Each firm has a short-run total cost curve STC(q)-0.1+150q2. What is the short-run equilibrium price and quantity in this market? 4. The short-run marginal cost curves of two types of firms in an industry are given as MC1 = 3q and MC2 = 5q respectively. There are 100 firms of each type. If these firms behave competitively, determine the...
3. Two firms that are engaged in Stackelberg competition face the market inverse demand curve P-100-2Q, where Q is the total 22-0.Sqy, what is Firm 1's (the first-mover's) nverse demand une output, q2. Each firm produces the product at a constant marginal cost of $22. If Firm 2's reaction function is P 56-4 OP=100-2(92-22 + 0.050;) OP=88-1.541 P 88-24
The market demand curve for a pair of duopolists is given as P=56- 2Q where Q=Q4 + Q2. The constant per unit marginal cost is O for firm 1 and 2 for firm 2. Both firms also have no fixed costs. Find the equilibrium price, quantity and profit for each firm if firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader and firm 2 a follower. Now re-do the computations assuming that firm 2 is the leader and firm 1 the follower. (Round...
Suppose there are two firms, 1 and 2, competing in quantity. The market demand is p = 15-(q1 +q2), where q1 and q2 are the quantities produced by rms 1 and 2. Both rms have constant marginal cost c1 = c2 = 3. (a) [10] Find the Cournot equilibrium of this market. Compute the consumer surplus in equilibrium. b) Now suppose firms 1 and 2 merge, so that they become a monopolist with demand function p = 15 ? q,...