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ECON M/C is this correct?

A duopoly faces the inverse demand curve p = 10 – 4, where q is the sum of firm 1s output 91 and firm 2s output (2 (q = 41

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where each firms Simual taneou L 10-q 2 lo-q Bertrand Price competition ( that is from 1 and from -2) decides Their Prices comarginal costs of firom-1 mc(91) = dollall 2 dai of firm-2 mc(ar) = dca (921 8 marginal cost of from is Less Than of Firm-2swhy (a) is not correct competitive equilibrium required That is Bertrand competitive Symmetry in costs mci = MC₂ Then we will

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