Consider two identical Cournot firms that each have a marginal cost of 20, facing the market inverse demand function: P=120-Q What is the quantity produced for each firm? Round your answer to the nearest 1 decimal places.
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Consider two identical Cournot firms that each have a marginal cost of 20, facing the market...
Consider two identical Cournot firms that have zero marginal cost facing the market inverse demand function: P = 100−1/2 Q What is the quantity produced by each firm? Round your answer to the nearest 1 decimal places.
Consider two Cournot firms, Firm A and Firm B. Firm A has a marginal cost of 10 and Firm B has a marginal cost of 5. They face the market inverse demand function: P=120-Q How many units will Firm A produce?
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Consider a Cournot competition with two firms, A and B. The marginal costs of each firm is MCA = MCB = 40. The inverse demand function is P = 130 - Q. Find the Nash equilibrium quantities for each firm and the market price.
Suppose a market has two firms that sell identical products. These firms face an inverse market demand function of P=120 – Q. Firm 1 has a constant MC=20. Firm 2’s marginal cost is MC=30. Find the Cournot equilibrium price, quantities, and profits for each firm. If these firms were able to perfectly collude, what would be the monopoly equilibrium?
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
Two firms sell identical products and compete as Cournot (price-setting) competitors in a market with a demand of p = 150 - Q. Each firm has a constant marginal and average cost of $3 per unit of output. Find the quantity each firm will produce and the price in equilibrium.
Consider two identical firms with no fixed costs and constant marginal cost c which compete in quantities in each of an infinite number of periods. The quantities chosen are observed by both firms before the next play begins. The inverse demand is given by p = 1 − q1 − q2, where q1 is the quantity produced by firm 1 and q2 is the quantity produced by firm 2. The firms use ‘trigger strategies’ and they revert to static Cournot...
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 200 – 2(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $75. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium quantity produced by each firm is _____. Hint: Write your answer to two decimal places.
3. Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 300 – 4(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $73. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium quantity produced by each firm is _____. Hint: Write your answer to two decimal places.