Suppose instead that Lysol and Clorox were competing using quantities (Cournot Competition). Also suppose that the...
this is a 2 part question
Suppose instead that Lysol and Clorox were competing using quantities (Cournot Competition). Also suppose that the respective marginal cost for each firm is Mysor - 2 - A sor and MC clorox = 2 = AC clorox. The inverse demand equation is still P-5-Q with the marginal revenue being MR-5-20. To make the following questions easier for you, the reaction curves have already been derived. For Lysol the reaction curve is nsor = 1.5...
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The market for disinfectant is dominated by 2 firms, Lysol and Clorox. The marginal cost (MC) for providing disinfectant is $1 (average cost is also $1), and the consumer form their demand for disinfectant via the following inverse demand equation P-5-Q:. The corresponding marginal revenue curve is: P-5-20 a. If Lysol and Clorox decide to collude, what quantities will be sold in the market...
The market for disinfectant is dominated by a firms, Lysol and Clorox. The marginal cost (MC) for providing disinfectant is $1 (average cost is also $1), and the consumer form their demand for disinfectant via the following inverse demand equation P-5-Q:. The corresponding marginal revenue curve is: P-5- 20 a. If Lysol and Clorox decide to collude, what quantities will be sold in the market and what price will consumers pay for this quantity? (s points) i. Quantity: il. Price:...
Suppose that instead of colluding, Lysol and Clorox are competing using prices (Bertrand competition). Also assume that marginal cost for Lysol and Clorox is $1. The inverse demand equation is still P=5-Q with the marginal revenue being P=5-20 a. What will be the market price that consumers pay? b. How many units will be supplied in the market at the market price found in part (a)?
this is a 2 part question
The market for disinfectant is dominated by 2 firms, Lysol and Clorox. The marginal cost (MC) for providing disinfectant is $1 (average cost is also $1), and the consumer form their demand for disinfectant via the following inverse demand equation P=5-Q:. The corresponding marginal revenue curve is: P=5- 2Q a. If Lysol and Clorox decide to collude, what quantities will be sold in the market and what price will consumers pay for this quantity...
Suppose two firms compete in Cournot competition. The market inverse demand curve is ? = 200 − ?1 − ?2. Firm 1 and firm 2 face the same marginal cost curve, ?? = 20. Therefore, profit for firm 1 is ?1 = (200 − ?1 − ?2)?2 − 20?1 and similarly for firm 2. a. Solve for the Cournot price, quantity, and profits. b. Suppose firm 1 is thinking about investing in technology that can reduce its costs to $15...
2) As in the above exercise 1), consider two firms with the same constant average and marginal cost AC=MC =5 facing the market demand curve Q1 + Q2 53- P. Now, let's consider the Stackelberg model in order to analyze what will happen when one of the firms makes its output decision ahead of the other firm Suppose that firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. How much will each firm produce? What is the resulting market price? How much profit...
Reference the following information about the market demand function for questions 1 to 15. These questions are on different types of market structures – monopoly, perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly market, and the Stackelberg oligopoly market. The market demand function is given the following equation: P = 1600 – Q where Q is the industry’s output level. Suppose initially this market is served by a single firm. Let the total cost function of this firm be given the function C(Q) =...
Cournot vs. Stackelberg Oligopoly Suppose the inverse demand function and the cost functions for two duopolists are given by: P = 100 – (Q1 + Q2) C1(Q1) = 2Q1 C2(Q2) = 2Q2 a. Cournot: Assume two Cournot duopolists. i. What is firm 1’s Quantity and Profit? R1 = (100-Q1-Q2) * Q1 R1 = 100Q1 - Q12 - Q2Q1 MR1 = 100 - 2Q1 - Q2 C1(Q1) = 2Q1 MC1 = 2 MR1 = MC1 ii. What is firm 2’s Quantity...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...