Brothers: Consider the following game that proceeds in two stages: In the first stage one brother...

Question

Question

Brothers: Consider the following game that proceeds in two stages: In the first stage one brother (player 2) has two $10 bill

Answer 1

Answer #1

1) an 410 620 Pif Pue Pr 0 EL P2, P2 P (10,10) F f 0 0 (22,26) (36,12) (20,0) 20,0) (3266) (20122) (10.10)

2) Spı = {0,F} Sp2 = {($20,0), ($20,F), ($10bill, O), ($10bill, F)}

Answer 2

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