Question

Two companies, Wonka and Gekko, each decide whether to produce a good quality product or a poor quality product. In the figur
0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

For Gekko,

If Wonks choose Good Quality, Gekko chooses Good Quality because it will give a higher payoff of 10

If Wonks choose bad quality, Gekko chooses good quality as it'll give a high pay off of 12

For Wonks,

If Gekko chooses poor quality, Wonks choose good quality as it'll give high pay off of 12

If Gekko chooses good quality, Wonks choose good quality as it'll give high payoff of 10

We can see both the players choose good quality in all the cases which is why it can be mentioned that

(b) both firms produce good quality product is the answer to this question

Because both produce good quality product,

(a,c,d) are wrong

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
Two companies, Wonka and Gekko, each decide whether to produce a good quality product or a...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • Table 17-7 Two companies, Wonka and Gekko, each decide whether to produce a good quality product...

    Table 17-7 Two companies, Wonka and Gekko, each decide whether to produce a good quality product or a poor quality product. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits (in millions of dollars) for the two companies. Wonka Good Quality Poor Quality Wonka - 10 Wonka - 9 Good Quality Gekko = 10 Gekko - 12 Gekko Wonka = 12 Wonka - 11 Poor Quality Gekko - 9 Gekko = 11 Refer to Table 17-7....

  • Two competing firms are each planning to introduce a new product. Each will decide whether to produce Product A, Produc...

    Two competing firms are each planning to introduce a new product. Each will decide whether to produce Product A, Product B, or Product C. They will make their choices at the same time.. The resulting payoffs are shown to the right Firm 2 Are there any Nash equilibria in pure strategies? If so, then what are they? В C O A. The Nash equilibria are for Firm 1 to introduce Product B and Firm 2 to introduce Product C and...

  • The following payoff matrix depicts two companies, Lowe's and Home Depot, in an advertising game. The companies will be playing the same game several times. Each company makes its decision without knowing what the other chooses. The payoffs for each firm

    The following payoff matrix depicts two companies, Lowe's and Home Depot, in an advertising game. The companies will be playing the same game several times. Each company makes its decision without knowing what the other chooses. The payoffs for each firm represent economic profits.Imagine that at the beginning of each week, Home Depot and Lowe's play the game described in the payoff matrix above. Assume there is no known end to the game, so Home Depot and Lowe's will effectively...

  • 2. Two firms, called Polluter 1 and Polluter 2, produce good A. The production of A...

    2. Two firms, called Polluter 1 and Polluter 2, produce good A. The production of A adversely affects the profits of a third firm, called Victim, which produces the good V. The profits of the three firms are as follows, where π| denotes Polluter 1's profits T2 Polluter 2's, and πυ Victims. where c0 and A - AA2. Suppose the government recognises that the Polluters' production of A imposes a negative externality on Victim, and to try to remedy this,...

  • There are two firms, Cope and Peski, in an oligopolistic industry. Each firm must decide whether...

    There are two firms, Cope and Peski, in an oligopolistic industry. Each firm must decide whether or not to advertise during the Super Bowl this year. The diagram below represents the matrix of expected profit payoffs for each firm depending on which of the four possible outcomes becomes reality. The first number in each cell represents the expected profit for Peski given the relevant combination of strategies for each firm. The second number in each cell represents the expected profit...

  • Two firms dominate the cellular phone carrier industry. Each quarter their advertising executives must decide if...

    Two firms dominate the cellular phone carrier industry. Each quarter their advertising executives must decide if their advertising budget wllbe Big (S10m) or Small (S1m). If one company chooses Big while the other chooses Small, the company that chose Big will steal a significant portion of the other company's market share. If the two companies choose identical budgets, then their respective market shares will remain unchanged. The following payoff matrix represents the two companies' problem: ATT Verizon Small Bi 80M...

  • BigBax and CheapStore are the only two firms in a market. Each firm must decide whether...

    BigBax and CheapStore are the only two firms in a market. Each firm must decide whether to price high or price low. The payoffs from each strategy combination are shown to the right-in millions of dollars. The first number in each pair is BigBox's profit, the second is CheapStore's profit Price Low Price High-.. Cheap Store $400 $600 For BigBox, the dominant strategy in this game is to This is the dominant strategy because t is the strategy that will...

  • 4. Suppose that firm 1 and firm 2 each produce the same product and face a...

    4. Suppose that firm 1 and firm 2 each produce the same product and face a market demand curve given by Q = 5000 – 200P. Firm 1 has a unit (marginal) cost of production ci = 6 while firm 2 has a unit cost of c2 = 10. Firms compete by setting prices and consumers in this market will always purchase from the firm with the lower price. In addition, suppose that firms must choose an integer price. This...

  • consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There are two firms that produce a homogenous...

    consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There are two firms that produce a homogenous good with the same constant marginal cost of c. a) Suppose that the rule for splitting up cunsumers when the prices are equal assigns all consumers to firm1 when both firms charge the same price. show that (p1,p2) =(c,c) is a Nash equilibrium and that no other pair of prices is a Nash equilibrium. b) Now, we assume that the Bertrand game in part...

  • 2. There are two firms in a market that produce an identical good, both with marginal...

    2. There are two firms in a market that produce an identical good, both with marginal cost MC=10. Fixed costs are zero for both firms. Suppose inverse demand for a product is P= 130 – e a) If the firms set the monopoly price and split the monopoly quantity. What quantities do they choose and what profit do they receive? b) Suppose they set quantities simultaneously. That is, suppose the firms play a Cournot game. What quantities do they choose...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT