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Let two oil firms, A and B, in a duopoly be choosing their production decisions. For...

Let two oil firms, A and B, in a duopoly be choosing their production decisions. For simplicity, assume they can choose two production levels: HI and LO. If both firms chooose LO, they each earn $3 billion. If both firms choose HI, they each earn $2 billion. If one firm chooses HI while the other chooses low, the HI firm earns $4 billion and the LO firm earns $1 billion. What is the Nash Equilibrium outcome?

A chooses LO, B chooses LO

A chooses HI, B chooses LO

A chooses LO, B chooses HI

A chooses HI, B chooses HI

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Answer #1

Page No Q) From given information, we have firm B. LO HI ul 2,2 4,1 firm A LO T, 3,3 Now, if firm A choose to choose HL, then

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