Question

Firm A and B are bidding on a government contract, and each firms bid is not known by the other firm. Each firm can bid High
0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

We will use the best response strategies to find the Nash equilbrium of the game

BR for firm A are as follows:

When B bids high, the BR is to bid high as payoff is higher than bidding low (3500 > 0)

When B bids low, the BR is to bid low as payoff is higher than bidding high (6000> 1500)

By symmetry of payoffs, we will get the same best responses for the firm B

Thus, from Best responses we can observe that the Nash equilibrium is where both the firms bid the same price that can happen in two instances - both firms bid high or both firms bid low

Thus, tehre are two nash equilibrum of the game:

(1) Both firms bid high ang get 3500 each

(2) Both firms bid low and get 6000 each

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
Firm A and B are bidding on a government contract, and each firm's bid is not...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • The table below is the payoff marrix for a simple two-firm game Firms A and B...

    The table below is the payoff marrix for a simple two-firm game Firms A and B are bidding on a government contract and each f's bid is not known by the other form. Each firm can bid other $14.000 or 55.000 The cost of completing the project for each firm is 53.000 The low bid firm will win the contractat its stated price the high dem wilgot nothing the two bids are equal, the two firms wil split the price...

  • Which of the following applies to both monopolistic competition and perfect competition? O A. Non-price competition...

    Which of the following applies to both monopolistic competition and perfect competition? O A. Non-price competition is common OB. All firms sell an identical product OC. Short run equilibrium is characterized by zero economic profits. O D. Entry barriers are low. O E. Firms are price-takers. The table below is the payoff matrix for a simple tworm game. Firms A and B are bidding on a government contract, and each firm's tid is not known by the other fem Each...

  • ppose two firms, Alstom from France, and Bombardier trom Canada, are bidding on a contract to...

    ppose two firms, Alstom from France, and Bombardier trom Canada, are bidding on a contract to replace train cars for the subway system in Mexico City If they bid the same amount they share the contract otherwise, the low wins. The figure below shows the payoff matrix for this content AllstomA) A bids 530 million 55 million bids $45 million ProtoA 515 Protto 515 Pro A 575m Puli hoà 50 m Bombardier (8) bids 30 million Pro A 50 m...

  • Consider the payoff matrix at right Firm B OA. The pair of strategies L-L is the...

    Consider the payoff matrix at right Firm B OA. The pair of strategies L-L is the only Nash equilibrium OB. The pairs of strategies - Hand L-L are the only Nash equilibria OC. The pair of strategies - His the only Nash equilibrium OD. The pairs of strategies L-Land L- Hare the only Nash equilibri OE. The pairs of strategies - Hand H-L are the only Nash equilibria H H FirmA Suppose two firms, Alstom from France, and Bombardier from...

  • Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an...

    Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....

  • Suppose you are a network systems provider and are bidding for the job of providing and...

    Suppose you are a network systems provider and are bidding for the job of providing and installing a system for a new government office building. You are considering submitting one of three bids: a low bid of $500,000, a medium bid of $600,000, and a high bid of $700,000. The cost of the job to you will be $450,000, regardless of your bid. Thus, if you submit a bid of $500,000 and win the contract, your profit will be $500,000...

  • Below is the problem: Suppose you are a network systems provider and are bidding for the...

    Below is the problem: Suppose you are a network systems provider and are bidding for the job of providing and installing a system for a new government office building. You are considering submitting one of three bids: a low bid of $500,000, a medium bid of $600,000, and a high bid of $700,000. The cost of the job to you will be $450,000, regardless of your bid. Thus, if you submit a bid of $500,000 and win the contract, your...

  • 7) A for-profit firm is bidding on a contract that would make it the sole provider...

    7) A for-profit firm is bidding on a contract that would make it the sole provider of trash and recycling pick-up services in a city. The city-wide demand for trash and recycling pick-up is given by Qp = 50,000 - 200P where is measured in tons of material picked up and P is the price per ton. That demand curve implies that the inverse demand (i.e., rewriting the demand equation with as a function of P) for trash and recycling...

  • Consider an example of the prisoner's dema where 2 forms are making sealed bids on a...

    Consider an example of the prisoner's dema where 2 forms are making sealed bids on a way construction contract and each firm is allowed to bid her 100 million or 5120 million. W both firms bid the same price, the job is shared equally and each team half the value of the bid Otherwise the west bidder wins the contract and receives the full value of is bid (and the other bidder cams zero) The cooperative outcome in this sition...

  • Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria...

    Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria you can of the following game. LCDR T 0,1 4,2 1,1 3,1 M 3,3 0,6 1,2 -1,1 B 2.5 1.7 3.8 0.0 2. This question refers to a second-price, simultaneous bid auction with n > 1 bidders. Assume that the bidders' valuations are 1, ,... where > > ... > >0. Bidders simultaneously submit bids, and the winner is the one who has the...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT