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1. A Nightclub owner has both student and adult customers. The demand for a typical student...
buestion 3 A night club owner has both student and adult customers. The demand for drinks by a typical student is Q. 18-3P. The demand for drinks by a typical adult is QA-10-2P. There are an equal number of adults and students. The marginal cost of each drink is $2. 6 18 Q 10 Part 1: a) What price will the club owner set if she cannot discriminate between the two groups? What will total profit be at this price?...
Only Q3 Thank you 1. An online retail store has both students and adult customers. Suppose that the demand for e-books by a typical adult is 24 = 30-3P. The demand for a typical student is 9. - 15 -2P. There are equal numbers of students and adults. The marginal cost of each e-book is $1. a. What price will the retail store choose if it cannot discriminate between the two groups? What will total profit be at this price?...
D Question 5 1 pts Laura runs a nightclub called the 'Two Standard Drinks. Given the popularity and cache of the club, she has a monopoly position in the market. The market demand curve is given by P = 120 - 9. Laura has a marginal cost per drink of MC = 2q and a fixed cost FC = $150. If Laura charges the same price to all customers. what are Laura's profit-maximising price PM and quantity qM? PM-590: -...
A nightclub manager realizes that demand for drinks is more elastic among students and tries to determine the optimal pricing schedule. Specifically, he estimates that the demand functions are given by q1 = 30 − 6p1 for students and q2 = 24 − 4p2 for non-students. Assume that drinks cost the nightclub $2 each. A. If the market cannot be segmented, what is the uniform monopoly price? (a) $3.10 (b) $3.30 (c) $3.50 (d) $3.70 (e) $4.20 B. If the...
6. The market demand is given by p() 36 q and a monopolist has the following (a) If the monopolist charges a uniform price (fixed price per ut), how much (b) If the monopolist can perfectly price discriminate (first degree), how muclh (c) How much extra surplus does the monopolist capture by price discriminating cost function TC() 24q would she produce and what is the price? What is the profit? would she produce? What is her profit? instead of charging...
ow our monopolist faces two types of customers: Type A has the inverse demand functi -300-5QA while type B has the inverse demand function P 150-5QB. The total function is still C 50Q 4a) If the monopolist can only charge uniform, linear prices but can distinguish between the two types and prevent resale (G.e., third-degree group price discrimination), what price will it charge on cost each type, and how much will each type buy and how much consumer surplus will...
1. Suppose there are two potential customers in the market. One has demand function D1(p)=10-p . The other has demand function D2(p)=20-2p. The only firm in this market has constant marginal cost of 2. (1) Draw the two demand curves in a graph, with price on the vertical axis and demand on the horizontal axis. (2) (3rd-degree price discrimination) If the monopoly can identify the two consumers and charge different prices to them, what is the optimal price charged to...
1. Suppose there are two potential customers in the market. One has demand function D1(p)=10-p . The other has demand function D2(p)=20-2p. The only firm in this market has constant marginal cost of 2. (1) Draw the two demand curves in a graph, with price on the vertical axis and demand on the horizontal axis. (2) (3rd-degree price discrimination) If the monopoly can identify the two consumers and charge different prices to them, what is the optimal price charged to...
1. Suppose there are two potential customers in the market. One has demand function D1(p)=10-p . The other has demand function D2(p)=20-2p. The only firm in this market has constant marginal cost of 2. (2nd-degree price discrimination) Given the market as described in the above question, suppose the monopolist cannot identify the two consumers, but he can use a single two-part tariff. (a)Find out the optimal fixed fee and per-unit price. (b)Is it more profitable to serve both consumers or...
1. Suppose there are two potential customers in the market. One has demand function D1(p)=10-p . The other has demand function D2(p)=20-2p. The only firm in this market has constant marginal cost of 2. (2nd-degree price discrimination) Given the market as described in the above question, suppose the monopolist cannot identify the two consumers, but he can use a single two-part tariff. (a)Find out the optimal fixed fee and per-unit price. (b)Is it more profitable to serve both consumers or...