The reaction function is calculated by differentiating the respective profit functions with respect the corresponding price and then putting the first order Condition to zero. As per the definition of reaction function, reaction function of firm 1 is obtained with p1 a function of p2 and vice-versa.
C) Reaction function of firm 1 is independent of value of alpha.
For firm 2 , as value of alpha will increase,the reaction function of firm 2 will shift outward and the value of p2 as well as p1 will also increase. Graphically :
can someone help on setting and solving for a-c Problem Set 2 ENV ECON 147 DUE:...
16:29 Back Problem Set 2 ECON 461 Problem Set 2 Summer 2019 Each qustion will receive equal weight in grading 1. Consider a duopoly in which two firms produce difierent varieties of a differentiated product at constant average and marginal cost 4 per unit. Let the equations of the inverse demand curves be P 700- 7 P-200- +9 (both equations valid wheree the implied prices and quantities are nonnega tive) (a) find Nash equilibrium prices, quantities, and payoffs for a...
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QUESTION 11 Consider an industry served by two firms, say firm 1 and firm 2, that sell identical goods The firms set prices P and P2 simultaneously to maximise profits and each firms has constant marginal costs of production. Suppose that marginal costs are c1 - C2-c, 0< c<5 and the demand faced by firm 1 0 if P1 > P2 4 50if P1 < P2 And by firm...
(2) Consider the following game: P U M D LR 3,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 0,4 3,1 (a) Show that M is a dominated strategy when mixed strategies are used. (b) Using the observation in part (a) above, find the mixed strategy NE for this game. (3) (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, F and F2 selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product 91 (P1.p2) = 10 - P1...
usion (24 points) Two firms are playing a repeated Bertrand game infinitely, each with the same marginal cost 100. The market demand function is P-400-Q. The firm who charges the lower price wins the whole market. When both firms charge the same price, each gets 1/2 of the total market. I. Coll A. (6 points) What price will they choose in the stage (only one period) Nash equilibrium? What price will they choose if in the stage game (only one...
Chapter overview 1. Reasons for international trade Resources reasons Economic reasons Other reasons 2. Difference between international trade and domestic trade More complex context More difficult and risky Higher management skills required 3. Basic concept s relating to international trade Visible trade & invisible trade Favorable trade & unfavorable trade General trade system & special trade system Volume of international trade & quantum of international trade Commodity composition of international trade Geographical composition of international trade Degree / ratio of...
A. Issues [1] In addition to damages for one year's notice period, can a trial judge award significant damages for the mere fact of an employee's dismissal, or for the stigma that that dismissal brings? Or for the employer thereafter competing with the ex-employee for the clients, before the ex-employee has got a new job? B. Basic Facts [2] This is an appeal from 2009 ABQB 591 (CanLII), 473 A.R. 254. [3] Usually a judgment recites facts before law. But...