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Two players, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 3, that is, si є 0, 1, 2, 3 . If the sum of numbers they choose is less than or equal to 3, s1 +82 3, each player i gets si dollars. However, if the sum they report is greater than 3, s2>3, each player gets0 dollars a) Write down the normal form of this game (b) Identify all pure NE

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