For each tree, find all pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE), and all pure strategy subgame-perfect Nash...
For each tree, find all pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE), and all pure strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). In every tree, payoffs are in alphabetical order. You can gain up to 10 points per tree (5 points for NE, 5 points for SPNE)
Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) by writing down a normal form representation and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Are the set of NE the same as the set of SPNE? If not, briefly explain why some of the NE is not SPNE. U D L R R (2.1) (0.0) (-1, 1) (3,2)
find all subgame perfect nash equilibria (SPE )for the following game 1. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) in the following game: 5, 6 9, 8 Y2, 6 6, 7 ?3.9 7,4 5, 5
Please show step by step and explanation: “All subgame perfect equilibria are Nash equilibria.” Is that claim true or false? If it is true, explain why so. If it is false, prove this point by constructing a counterexample to the claim (i.e. a game in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium which is not a Nash equilibrium).
(b) Compute the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria and test for the intuitive criterion in the signaling game in Fig. 5.8. 1,2 0,1 tu O: 18) .5 2, 0 3,0 Chance 0,0 1,0 it R II-3 3,1 .2.2 Just find the perfect Nash equlibriam
Some Game Theory Problems 3. Find all of the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of the following simultaneous move game. After solving it as a simultaneous move game, write it as a sequential move game with column moving first. Drow the game tree and solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Column 9,4 1,10 15,7 15,5 14,8 3,10 12,18 20,12 Row C 7,8 6,8 20,10 3,3 15,9 15,0 14,2 9,1 20,18 2,9 10,14 19,20
6. Consider the following game: a. Identify all Nash Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous game. b. Draw the two extensive form games that arise from each firm moving first. What are the Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games? c. Identify a trigger strategy for each player that sustains (B,B) as an equilibrium. For what interest (discount) rates will this outcome be sustainable?
Froblem #5: Convert extensive-form to strategic-form, find Nash equilibria and subgame. perfect Nash equilibria (12pts) Consider the following extensive-form game: Veto Y Don't Veto In this game, Players 1 and 2 are deciding on a course of action, which may be X, Y, or Z Player 2 is the one who actually makes the choice, but first Player may choose to veto Y, which is the option Player 1 prefers the least. a) List all the strategies available to Player...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. c.) Explain why, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player must be indifferent between the pure strategies that she randomizes over. Consider the following game: - 2 LR 2
Find all pure strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games a.) Player 2 b1 b2 b3 a1 1,3 2,2 1,2 a2 2,3 2,3 2,1 a3 1,1 1,2 3,2 a4 1,2 3,1 2,3 Player 1 b.) Player 2 A B C D A 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 B 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 C 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 D 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 Player 1 c.) Player 2 S B S 3,2 1,1 B 0,0 2,3