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Exercises 5.1. Consider a contest between two competitors, A and B, for a prize totaling $20....
5. [20] Consider a contest where two contestants, i E (1,2), compete for a prize worth v (in utility terms). The probability of contestant i wining the compe tition is e1+e2 where e is the effort exerted by contestant i. The losing contestant gets nothing. The (utility) cost of effort is c(e)-e. Thus, contestant i's payoff is given by (a) [8] Find the symmetric Nash equilibrium effort level. (b) [4] Given an interpretation of r. Give an interpretation of what...
5. [20] Consider a contest where two contestants, i e (1,2), compete for a prize worth v (in utility terms). The probability of contestant i wining the compe- P(e1,e2)2 where es is the effort exerted by contestant i. The losing contestant gets tition is ei nothing, The (utility) cost of effort is c(e) = e[. Thus, contestant i's payoff is given by (a) 18] Find the symmetric Nash equilibrium effort level. (b) (4] Given an interpretation of r. Give an...
5. [20] Consider a contest where two contestants, i E (1,2), compete for a prize worth v (in utility terms). The probability of contestant i wining the compe- P(a, ea) = el + e2, where e is the effort exerted by contestant i. The losing contestant gets nothing. The (utility) cost of effort is cfe) et. Thus, contestant i's payoff tition is is given by (a) [8] Find the symmetric Nash equilibrium effort level. (b) 14] Given an interpretation of...