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5 Cournot Suppose there are two departments selling economics degrees in one market competing fol- lowing the rules of the Co6 Stackelberg Now suppose man. econ is the first mover following the Stackelerg Oligopoly Model, but everything else stays th

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Two departments sell degree of economics in a market. The market demand function is, Q 7200 2p 7200 Q 2 -3600 2 Here, Q 1+q2at 3600-ql--g2-3000 1 0 600-q ql 600-- Hence, the best response function for department 1 is ql 600-q2 2 The profit functionql 600 600 ql 1 gl 600 300+-gl 1 gl 300 ql 300 x 3 - 400 Substitute the value of ql in function q2 and solve as foll s: q2 605.6 The plot of residual demand for department 1 (econ) with equilibrium is shown below 3200 MC 200 00 Residual demand MR. 30q2 BR1 BR2 600 (400,400) 400 200 20 400 640 800 120 1400 1000 C ql 6. In Stackelberg equilibrium, the equilibrium takes placea 3600-l- 3000 = 0-7-10. 0 600-q q2 ql 600 1 Hence, the best response function for department econ is ql 600-q2 6.2 The residd 3600-300 2-q2-3000 dq2 0 300 2 q2-300x 2 600 Substitute value of q2 in the best response of econ department, 1 ql 600-(600)6.6 The plot of residual demand for department 2 (man. econ) with equilibrium is shown below 4000 3,150 000 MC 2000- Demand 1

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