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4. A Consider Cournot model of oligopoly where each firm simultaneously makes a quantity decision. Let yi and y2 denote the quantities 1 and 2, respectively. Let P(Y) = 100-Y be the market-clearing price when the aggregate quantity on the market is Y y1 +y2. Assume that the cost function of firm 1 and firm 2 are as follows. C1(n)-60y1 and C2(2) 60y2. (a) Write down the profit function of firm 1 and firm 2. (of a homogeneous product) produced by firms (b) Find a best response function for each firm. y2 (c) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium Vi and (d) Find the Cournot-Nash price p (e) Represent the reaction curves and the equilibrium (vi,vip)
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