Questions 16-17 rely on the following information. Firms H and I Cournot compete in a market...
Questions 22-24 rely on the following prompt: Two street vendors (Vendor I and Vendor 2) with mobile carts produce the same good which they sell at the same price. Customers are located along a linear boardwalk with six locations (Location A through Location F), with a different number of customers in each location, as pictured below: 18 So, there are X customers in location A, 4 in B, 6 in C, 2 in D, 8 in E and 18 in...
Questions 22-24 rely on the following prompt: Two street vendors (Vendor 1 and Vendor 2) with mobile carts produce the same good which they sell at the same price. Customers are located along a linear boardwalk with six locations (Location A through Location F), with a different number of customers in each location, as pictured below: 18 So, there are X customers in location A, 4 in B, 6 in C, 2 in D, 8 in E and 18 in...
Questions 22-24 rely on the following prompt: Two street vendors (Vendor 1 and Vendor 2) with mobile carts produce the same good which they sell at the same price. Customers are located along a linear boardwalk with six locations (Location A through Location F), with a different number of customers in each location, as pictured below: А E 12 16 58 So, there are X customers in location A, 4 in B, 12 in C, 4 in D, 16 in...
Questions 10-12 rely on the following prompt: Firm 1 and Firm 2 compete as Cournot duopolists, producing q1 and q2 units of output respectively, such that market output Q=q1+q2. They face market inverse demand of P = 400 − 2Q. Firm 1’s Total cost is given by TC1=2q1^2. Firm 2’s by TC2=2q2^2. 10. What is Firm 1’s equilibrium profit maximizing output level, q1*? 11. What is market output in the Cournot equilibrium for this market (so, what is the value...
Reference the following information about the market demand function for questions 1 to 15. These questions are on different types of market structures – monopoly, perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly market, and the Stackelberg oligopoly market. The market demand function is given the following equation: P = 1600 – Q where Q is the industry’s output level. Suppose initially this market is served by a single firm. Let the total cost function of this firm be given the function C(Q) =...
usion (24 points) Two firms are playing a repeated Bertrand game infinitely, each with the same marginal cost 100. The market demand function is P-400-Q. The firm who charges the lower price wins the whole market. When both firms charge the same price, each gets 1/2 of the total market. I. Coll A. (6 points) What price will they choose in the stage (only one period) Nash equilibrium? What price will they choose if in the stage game (only one...