1. In the following game, find the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium through the underlining process...

Question

Question

1. In the following game, find the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium through the underlining process discussed in class Player 2

Answer 1

Answer #1

Answer:

If player 1 Chooses Up, then player2 gets 6 by choosing left and 5 by choosing right. So clearly player2 chooses Left

If player 1 Chooses Down, then player2 gets 4 by choosing left and 8 by choosing right. So clearly player2 chooses Right.

If player2 Chooses Left, then player1 gets 12 by choosing Up and 10 by choosing Down. So clearly player1 chooses Up.

If player2 Chooses Right, then player1 gets 15 by choosing Up and 22 by choosing down. So clearly player1 chooses Down.

Therefore the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium points are (12,6) & (22,8)

Answer 2

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