Suppose that a price-taker firm has a marginal cost function given by: MC= 20+0.5q. The firm could join a cartel in its industry and agree to a quota of 5 units. The collusion drives the price of the good from $25.45 to $55.00. Suppose that if the firm cheats on the cartel, it has no effect on the price. Calculate the producer surplus of this firm when they cheat on the cartel.
Solution:-
Producer surplus is the area left of the quantity and above MC curve and below the price
MC = 20 + 0.5*5
= 22.5
Y intercept of the MC curve = 20
PS = 0.5 * (MC - Y intercept of the MC curve ) * Q + (P - MC) * Q
= 0.5 * (22.5 - 20) * 5 + (55 - 22.5) * 5
= 6.25 + 162.50
= 168.75
The producer surplus is $168.75
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