Toyota | |||
Adopt | Not Adopt | ||
Honda | Adopt | 2.5, 2.5 | 3, 1.5 |
Not Adopt | 1.5, 3 | 1, 1 |
Two players: Honda and Toyota
Two strategies: To adopt side airbags or not adopt them
When Honda chooses to adopt for side bags, Toyota will also choose to adopt them as it gets a higher pay-off.(2.5 > 1.5)
When Honda chooses to not adopt for side-bags, Toyota will choose for adopting them as it gives a higher pay-off.(3 > 1)
Similarly, when Toyota chooses to adopt for side bags, Honda will choose to adopt as it gives a higher pay-off.(2.5 > 1.5)
When Toyota chooses to no adopt the side bags, Honda will choose for the side bags, as it gives him a higher pay-off.(3 > 1)
Then the Nash equilibrium is to adopt for side bags for both the companies = (Adopt, Adopt) = (2.5, 2.5)
Yes, as it will give me maximum profit.
-answer all of the questions. - type answers on a computer. Do not print by hand! topic: game theory/ price strategy Suppose Toyota and Honda must decide whether to make a new breed of side-impa...
Suppose Toyota and Honda must decide whether to make a new breed of side-impact airbags standard equipment on all models. Side-impact airbags raise the price of each automobile by $1,000. If both firms make side-impact airbags standard equipment, each company will earn profits of $0.5 billion. If neither company adopts the side-impact airbag technology, each company will earn $1.2 billion. If one company adopts the technology as standard equipment and the other does not, the adopting company will earn a...