*Explain why oligopolistic firms want to collude instead of competing. Discuss the potential negative effects of collusion in the economy.
The oligopolistic market where there are few numbers of sellers always try to form collusion because to avoid a price war
Price war means different price setting by different firms which will create instability in the market and everey seller does make to manage a good profit
So they form collusion instead of competing.
Best example is OIL AND PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES(OPEC)
Negative effects of collusion on the economy are-
1. They will charge the price according to their will and this will cause trouble for many lower and middle-class people in the society
2. They will behave as a monopoly who has full control on the market but trouble for the consumers
3. If there is any conflict among the colluded firms, then this will affect the whole collusion and ultimately bad for the economy.
*Explain why oligopolistic firms want to collude instead of competing. Discuss the potential negative effects of collu...
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot competition equilibrium over the collusion of the two firms in question 3? f. Do the two firms prefer Cournot competition over colluding (assuming the collusion agreement is to split joint profits equally)?
Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q=18-P) with the same cost (C(Q)=1/2 *Q^2). Set up firm 1’s profit maximization. Solve for firm 1’s best response function. Solve for firm 1’s quantity, firm 2’s quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. Is this a Nash equilibrium? Do consumers prefer the Cournot competition equilibrium over the collusion of the two firms...
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium? e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot...
Explain duopolit’s dilemma. Your answer should explain as to why both the competing firms end up with low price option while they optimally could have gone for the high price and high profit. i don't want the answer in picture
In many oligopolistic industries, the same firms compete over a long period of time, setting prices and observing each other's behavior repeatedly. Given the large number of repetitions, why don't collusive outcomes typically result? Collusive outcomes are difficult to sustain in repeated games because O A. demand conditions often are static. O B. players often doubt that their opponents are perfectly rational. O C. successful collusion encourages entry O D. such games often continue indefinitely without end O E. players...
Discuss potential positive and negative influences if network effects providing specific examples.
Q4. Suppose a duopoly is characterized by the following profits: if the two firms collude and charge the joint profit-maximizing price, they each earn a profit equal to 1500 in each period; if the two firms charge the Cournot–Nash price, they each earn a profit equal to 1200 in each period; and if one firm defects while the other charges the joint profit-maximizing price, the firm that defects earns 3000 and the other earns 0. [20 marks] a) [3 marks]...
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Explain through an equation the relationship between ”markups” and the amount of firms competing in an industry. (You can assume equally sized firms.) How can this relationship be used to estimate the relevance of the monopoly problem for the entire economy if you interpret a firm’s average markup in a year to be equal to return the firm’s stockholders make over that year?
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