Refer to the normal-form game of advertising shown below.
Firm A |
Firm B | |||
Advertise | Do Not Advertise | |||
Advertise | $0,$0 | $175,$10 | ||
Do Not Advertise | $10,$175 | $125,$125 |
Consider the advertising game in Figure 10-17. Firms A and B know
the game will be played for exactly five periods. What is a Nash
equilibrium to this game?
{advertise, do not advertise}
{advertise, advertise}
{do not advertise, do not advertise} provided the interest rate is less than 0.10 percent
{advertise, advertise} provided the interest rate is less than 0.50 percent
Advertise | dont | |
Advertise | (0,0) | (175*,10•) |
Don't | (10*,175•) | (125,125) |
Now Nash eqm of stage game :
(Dont advertise, advertise) & (advertise, don't )
if game is repeated for a finite time period, then only Nash eqm of stage game is played every period, no other strategy pair can be sustained as SPNE.
answer is option A)
Refer to the normal-form game of advertising shown below. Firm A Firm B Advertise Do Not Advertise Advertise...
Refer to the following normal form game of price competition. Firm B Low Price Low Price 0,0 Firm A High Price -2, 17 High Price 17,-2 9,9 Suppose the game is infinitely repeated, and the interest rate is 10%. Both firms agree to charge a high price, provided no player has charged a low price in the past. If both firms stick to this agreement, then the present value of Firm A's payoffs are: $0.82 $9 $99 $187
Refer to the
normal-form game of price competition shown below.
Firm A must decide whether or not to introduce a new product. If
firm A introduces a new product, firm B must decide whether or not
to clone the product. The payoff structure of the game is depicted
in Figure 10-12. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to this game
is:
Multiple Choice
A. Firm A plays "Introduce"; firm B plays "Clone" if firm A
plays "Introduce."
B. Firm A plays...
11. The table below shows a game played between two firms, Firm A and Firm B. In this game, each firm must decide how much output (Q) to produce: 2 units or 3 units. The profit for each firm is given in the table as (Profit for Firm A, Profit for Firm B). Firm B Q=2 Q=3 Q=2 / (10, 10) (8, 12) Firm A Q=3 (12,8) L (6,6) a. What is the dominant strategy for each firm? Explain. b....
Refer to the following normal form game of price competition. Firm B Low Price High Price 17,-2 Firm A Low Price High Price 0,0 -2, 17 9,9 What is the maximum interest rate than can sustain collusion? 24.3% 12.5% 78.5% 112.5%
Use the payoff matrix to answer the following questions. Firm K Strategy A B Firm J X 8, 8 18, -4 Y -4, 18 10, 10 (2 points) Does Firm J have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it? (2 points) Identify all of the Nash equilibrium positions. If there is no Nash equilibrium, indicate “None.” (2 points) Assume this is a one-shot, simultaneous game. Where will the game end? If the end game cannot be predicted indicate “No...
4. (10 points) At cereal a time maker when Kellogg's demand was for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellog and its rival to advertise or "don't advertise" is...
Refers to gametheory strategy
4. (10 points) At cereal a time maker when Kellogg's demand was for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellog and its rival to advertise...
4. (10 points) At cereal a time maker when Kellogg's demand was for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellog and its rival to advertise or “don't advertise” is...
4. (10 points) At a time when cereal maker Kellogg's demand for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellogg and its rival to advertise or “don't advertise” is given...
4. (10 points) At a time when cereal maker Kellogg's demand for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellogg and its rival to advertise or “don't advertise” is given below...