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2. There are 9 fimms compete Cournot in an industry. The industry demand curve is given...
Consider an industry with demand Q a -p where 3 identical firms that compete a la Problem 4. Cournot. Each fim's cost function is given by C F+cq. Suppose two of the firms merge and that the merged firm's cost function is given by C = F' + dq, where F<F' < 2F. (a) Determine each firm's market share before and after the merger Check: https://www.justice.gov/atr/15-concentration-and-market-shares 2 (b) Suppose that a = 10 and c 3. Determine the Herfindahl index...
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 120-2Q. The total cost function for each firm is TC1(Q) = 4Q1. The total cost function for firm 2 is TC2(Q) = 2Q2. What is the output of each firm? Find: Q1 = ? Q2 = ?
Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 41500 - 98 Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1 = 1137 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2 = 813 Q. What quantity will of output will the duopoly produce ? (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 9150 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 400 .) Ans. 66.69
ECON M/C Q An industry has two firms. The demand curve for the industry's output is given by p= 36 - 3q, where q is the total industry output. Each firm has a constant marginal cost equal to 6. Suppose that firms compete in Cournot style (quantity competition). Which of the following statements is correct? Select one: a. Firm 1's reaction function is q1 = 9 -0.592. b. Firm 1's reaction function is qı = 9 - 92. C. Firm...
Consider a homogeneous product industry with inverse demand function p-35 -Q a) Assume that the industry is initially monopolized by an incumbent firm (firm I) which has the exclusive right to use the state-of-the-art technology summarized by the total cost function C-10q. Find the initial monopoly equilibrium (price, quantity, industry profit, consumer surplus and total surplus) and the associated degrees of concentration (Herfindahl index) and market power (Lerner index) b) Assume now that a new firm (firm N) discovers and...
Consider a homogeneous product industry with inverse demand function p-35 -Q a) Assume that the industry is initially monopolized by an incumbent firm (firm I) which has the exclusive right to use the state-of-the-art technology summarized by the total cost function C-10q. Find the initial monopoly equilibrium (price, quantity, industry profit, consumer surplus and total surplus) and the associated degrees of concentration (Herfindahl index) and market power (Lerner index) b) Assume now that a new firm (firm N) discovers and...
Find the value of Q when Firms A and B Cournot compete to maximize profits (i.e. when they simultaneously determine profit maximizing output). Firm A and Firm B compete in the sale of a product with market inverse demand given by P(0) = 260-Q, where Q is market output, and Q = 9A + 96 (9A = Firm A's output, 93 = Firm B's output). Firm A's Total Cost function is given by TCA9A) = 209A and Firm B's is...
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
[Cournot competition with N firms] There are three identical firms in the industry. The inverse demand function is p(Q-1-Q, where Q = q1 +92+93 denotes aggregate output. To facilitate your calculations, assume that the marginal cost for all firms is zero, c 0· 2. (a) Find the best response function for each firm. Interpret b) Compute the Cournot equilibrium. (c) Assume that two of the three firms merge (transforming the industry into a duopoly). Show that the profit of the...
Suppose two firms compete in Cournot competition. The market inverse demand curve is ? = 200 − ?1 − ?2. Firm 1 and firm 2 face the same marginal cost curve, ?? = 20. Therefore, profit for firm 1 is ?1 = (200 − ?1 − ?2)?2 − 20?1 and similarly for firm 2. a. Solve for the Cournot price, quantity, and profits. b. Suppose firm 1 is thinking about investing in technology that can reduce its costs to $15...