Homework Answers
The sub-game perfection in period 2 needs the play of the only Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Because there is one exactly Nash equilibrium for the stage game, thus in period 2 the selection of the Nash equilibrium to be played would not impact the incentives in period 1. Therefore, the only sub-game perfect equilibrium would be the play of Nash equilibrium for the stage game in both the periods. If there is any infinite T, the logic from the two-period case would be applicable, and the answer remains the same.
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4. If its stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium, how many subgame perfect equilibria does...
Game Theory Economics If its stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium, how many subgame perfect...
Game Theory Economics If its stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium, how many subgame perfect equilibria does a two-period, repeated game have? Explain. Would this answer change if there were T periods, where T is any finite integer?
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash equilibrium Suppose a stage game has...
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash
equilibrium
Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible. b In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. C.The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In a finitely repeated game where T...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough. b. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: &n...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice:
. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: Player 2 Left Middle Right Player 1 Top 4, 3 0, 0 1, 4 Bottom 0, 0 2, 1 0, 0 There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of the stage game. (a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
How many Nash Equilibria in pure strategies does this game have? Question 3 0,1 1,0 0,0...
How many Nash Equilibria in pure strategies does this game
have?
Question 3 0,1 1,0 0,0 How many Nash Equilibria in pure strategies does this game have? ооооо
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the symmetric two-player stage game in figure PR 13.2. The first number in a cell is player 1's single-period payoff. Assume that past actions are commo...
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the symmetric
two-player stage game in figure PR 13.2. The first number in a cell
is player 1's single-period payoff. Assume that past actions are
common knowledge. Each player's payoff is the present value of the
stream of single-period payoffs where the discount factor is d. (a)
Derive the conditions whereby the following strategy profile is a
subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium:
2 Consider the infinitely repeated version of the symmetric two-player stage game in...
Exercise 3: In class we discussed the Nash Equilibrium solution concept and how it is useful...
Exercise 3: In class we discussed the Nash Equilibrium solution concept and how it is useful to eliminate non-rational behavior, but with the disadvantage of not necessarily leading to a unique solution. One possible refinement that can be considered is the following: "If more than one Nash Equilibrium exist, but one of them makes every player better off than under the other Nash Equilibria, then surely that is the Nash Equilibrium that will be played." Consider playing the following simultaneous...
8.3 292 Part 3: Uncertainty and Strategy Shov 8.3 The game of Chicken is played by...
8.3
292 Part 3: Uncertainty and Strategy Shov 8.3 The game of Chicken is played by two macho teens who speed branded the chicken, whereas the one who does not veer gains peer- group esteem. Or course, t neither veers, both die of s toward each other on a single-lane road. The first Gan 120 of course, if neither veers, both die iote resulting crash. Payoftis to the Chicken game are provided in the following table. 8.6 The fol Teen...
Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria...
Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria you can of the following game. LCDR T 0,1 4,2 1,1 3,1 M 3,3 0,6 1,2 -1,1 B 2.5 1.7 3.8 0.0 2. This question refers to a second-price, simultaneous bid auction with n > 1 bidders. Assume that the bidders' valuations are 1, ,... where > > ... > >0. Bidders simultaneously submit bids, and the winner is the one who has the...
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash
equilibrium
Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible. b In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. C.The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In a finitely repeated game where T...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough. b. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
How many Nash Equilibria in pure strategies does this game
have?
Question 3 0,1 1,0 0,0 How many Nash Equilibria in pure strategies does this game have? ооооо
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the symmetric
two-player stage game in figure PR 13.2. The first number in a cell
is player 1's single-period payoff. Assume that past actions are
common knowledge. Each player's payoff is the present value of the
stream of single-period payoffs where the discount factor is d. (a)
Derive the conditions whereby the following strategy profile is a
subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium:
2 Consider the infinitely repeated version of the symmetric two-player stage game in...
Exercise 3: In class we discussed the Nash Equilibrium solution concept and how it is useful to eliminate non-rational behavior, but with the disadvantage of not necessarily leading to a unique solution. One possible refinement that can be considered is the following: "If more than one Nash Equilibrium exist, but one of them makes every player better off than under the other Nash Equilibria, then surely that is the Nash Equilibrium that will be played." Consider playing the following simultaneous...
8.3
292 Part 3: Uncertainty and Strategy Shov 8.3 The game of Chicken is played by two macho teens who speed branded the chicken, whereas the one who does not veer gains peer- group esteem. Or course, t neither veers, both die of s toward each other on a single-lane road. The first Gan 120 of course, if neither veers, both die iote resulting crash. Payoftis to the Chicken game are provided in the following table. 8.6 The fol Teen...
Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria you can of the following game. LCDR T 0,1 4,2 1,1 3,1 M 3,3 0,6 1,2 -1,1 B 2.5 1.7 3.8 0.0 2. This question refers to a second-price, simultaneous bid auction with n > 1 bidders. Assume that the bidders' valuations are 1, ,... where > > ... > >0. Bidders simultaneously submit bids, and the winner is the one who has the...
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