Question

GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash equilibrium

Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible. b In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. C.The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE. e. Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough.

Answer 1

Answers: The correct options should be a, c, and d.

Explanation: ​​​​​​b, can't be the right options as it says that NE is being played in both stage. This need not be true as it is possible to choose an outcome that gives higher payoff to both or all the players in period 1 and they play NE only in second period.

Similarly, d can't be the correct answer as we can only support the outcome that gives higher payoff than NE.

Rest of the options are correct.