Please help me Game theory !!! 10minutes left.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times.
To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to
a.
2/3.
b.
(C,E) cannot be part of a SPNE.
c.
1/7.
d.
1/3.
e.
3/7.
Homework Answers
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Please help me Game theory !!! 10minutes left.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it...
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D...
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D EF A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to C. 1/3 d. (CE) cannot be part of a SPNE.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D...
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D EF A 1,1 1,11,1 PlayerI B 1,8 7,51,1 c | 5,7 | 8,3 | 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (B,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to Ob. 1/3 ос. 37
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 DEF...
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 DEF A 1, 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to O a. 1/3 O b. 2/3 O d. (C,E)cannot be part of a SPNE
QUESTION 10 Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player...
QUESTION 10 Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 D E F A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1.1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (B.D in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to o a. O b. 1/3 (B.E) cannot be part of a SPNE o d.23 Ce.3/7.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. To sustain a...
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated
infinitely many times.
To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by
means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than
or equal to
a.
2/3.
b.
(C,E) cannot be part of a SPNE.
c.
1/7.
d.
1/3.
e.
3/7.
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash equilibrium Suppose a stage game has...
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash
equilibrium
Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible. b In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. C.The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In a finitely repeated game where T...
QUESTION 7 Player II A 3,40,7 В 5,0 1,2 Player I Consider the stage game above...
QUESTION 7 Player II A 3,40,7 В 5,0 1,2 Player I Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. For (A,C) to be playe every period as a SPNE using trigger strategies for Player 1 not to deviate, and more than or equal to the discount factor needs to be more than or equal to for Player 2 not to deviate. Therefore, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to fractional form; ie.,...
3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: 112 C D C 2,...
3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: 112 C D C 2, 2 0, 3 D 3,0 1, 1 Let uj be the payoff to player i in period t. Player i (i-1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by ( where o is the common discount factor of both players Suppose the players try to sustain (C, C) in each period by the Grim Trigger strategy. That is, each player plays the following...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough. b. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE...
3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: C 2, 2 0, 3...
3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: C 2, 2 0, 3 D 3,0 1, Let uj be the payoff to player i in period t. Player i (i 1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by ( o0 (1-6 X6u where o is the common discount factor of both players Suppose the players try to sustain (C, C) in each period by the Grim Trigger strategy. That is, each player plays the following...
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D EF A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to C. 1/3 d. (CE) cannot be part of a SPNE.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D EF A 1,1 1,11,1 PlayerI B 1,8 7,51,1 c | 5,7 | 8,3 | 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (B,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to Ob. 1/3 ос. 37
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 DEF A 1, 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to O a. 1/3 O b. 2/3 O d. (C,E)cannot be part of a SPNE
QUESTION 10 Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 D E F A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1.1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (B.D in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to o a. O b. 1/3 (B.E) cannot be part of a SPNE o d.23 Ce.3/7.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated
infinitely many times.
To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by
means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than
or equal to
a.
2/3.
b.
(C,E) cannot be part of a SPNE.
c.
1/7.
d.
1/3.
e.
3/7.
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash
equilibrium
Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible. b In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. C.The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In a finitely repeated game where T...
QUESTION 7 Player II A 3,40,7 В 5,0 1,2 Player I Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. For (A,C) to be playe every period as a SPNE using trigger strategies for Player 1 not to deviate, and more than or equal to the discount factor needs to be more than or equal to for Player 2 not to deviate. Therefore, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to fractional form; ie.,...
3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: 112 C D C 2, 2 0, 3 D 3,0 1, 1 Let uj be the payoff to player i in period t. Player i (i-1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by ( where o is the common discount factor of both players Suppose the players try to sustain (C, C) in each period by the Grim Trigger strategy. That is, each player plays the following...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough. b. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE...
3. (Level A) Suppose the following Prisoner's Dilemma is repeated infinitely: C 2, 2 0, 3 D 3,0 1, Let uj be the payoff to player i in period t. Player i (i 1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by ( o0 (1-6 X6u where o is the common discount factor of both players Suppose the players try to sustain (C, C) in each period by the Grim Trigger strategy. That is, each player plays the following...
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