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QUESTION 7 Player II A 3,40,7 В 5,0 1,2 Player I Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. For (A,C) to be playe every period as a SPNE using trigger strategies for Player 1 not to deviate, and more than or equal to the discount factor needs to be more than or equal to for Player 2 not to deviate. Therefore, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to fractional form; ie., instead of 1/2 enter 0.5) (Please, enter a numerical value not in
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