QUESTION 3 Player A 1,17,1 B 1,-1 4,5 Player I Consider the stage game above and...

Question

Question

Answer 1

Answer #1

Answer:

Given data :

Now, we can say that :

Each player 1 can make a move An and B and player 2 can make a move C and D .
Thus, player 1 is plays activity B in the first time frame then it needs to play activity " A " in the second time frame .
Because he has just two alternatives An or B and if player 2 activity B in the first time frame.
what's more, plays activity "C" in the second time frame
if the first time frame results fix ( B, D) and play activity "C " generally.

Answer 2

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