QUESTION Player I A 6,6 2,7 2,-2 Player B 74 2,-2 1,1 C 2.2 1,1 1,1...
10 p QUESTION 2 Player l A 6,6 -2,7 -2,-2 Player I B 742,2 1,- C 2,-2 1,1 1,1 game in which the stage game above is repeated twice and there is no discounting. The maximum payoff a player can achieve in a SPNE of the repeated game is (Please, enter a numerical value like:-1,0, 0.5, 3.5, 4, etc)
QUESTION 3 Player A 1,17,1 B 1,-1 4,5 Player I Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated twice without discounting. There exist a SPNE in which the first period outcome is (B,D). To support this SPNE player 1 plays action B in the first period and action period, and plays action in the second period. Player 2 plays action D in the first in the second if the first period outcome was (B,D) and plays action otherwise
QUESTION 5 Player III PlayerII Player lI Player i A 11,1 444 A 3,3,0 3,1,7 B 118 31A Player I B 7,5,7 -1,6,3 Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated twice without discounting. Consider all possible SPNE in pure strategies for the twice repeated game. The highest payoff Player 1 can get in a SPNE is The highest payoff Player 2 can get in a SPNE is . Finally, the highest payoff Player 3 can get in...
QUESTION 9 Consider the stage game below and suppose it is repeated twice Player 2 D E F A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1.1 с 5,7 | 8,3 | 1,1 The following strategy profiles are stage Nash equilibria (select all that apply) e (B,E
QUESTION 10 Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 D E F A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1.1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (B.D in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to o a. O b. 1/3 (B.E) cannot be part of a SPNE o d.23 Ce.3/7.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D EF A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to C. 1/3 d. (CE) cannot be part of a SPNE.
Game theory Player 2 DEF A 1,1 1,11,1 Player I B ,8 7,51,1 C5,7 8,3 1,1 The following strategy profiles are stage Nash equilibria (select all that apply) a.(C,D b. (B,E R2. С. (AP) O e. (CE) . (B,F
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 DEF A 1, 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to O a. 1/3 O b. 2/3 O d. (C,E)cannot be part of a SPNE
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: Player 2 Left Middle Right Player 1 Top 4, 3 0, 0 1, 4 Bottom 0, 0 2, 1 0, 0 There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of the stage game. (a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: Player 2 Left Middle Right Player 1 Top 4, 3 0, 0 1, 4 Bottom 0, 0 2, 1 0, 0 There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of the stage game. (a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...