Consider the following demand and cost functions; P = 16000 - 4Q Q = Q. +...
Consider the following demand and cost functions; P = 16000 - 4Q Q = Q. + Q: C(0) = 4000Q. C:(02) = 600002 (2) Stackelberg Model. Assume that firm 1 is the leader. (a) (2 points) What is the output for each firm? (b) (3 points) What is the market equilibrium price and quantity? (c) (2 points) What is the profit of each firm?
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. (a) Assume a monopolist is operating in this market. (i) Calculate the quantity (qM) chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist. (ii) At the profit-maximizing quantity, what is the monopolistic market price (pM) of the product. (iii) Calculate the dead-weight loss (allocative inefficiency) associated with this monopoly market. Assume the market for this product is perfectly competitive. (i) Calculate the market-clearing output (qPC)...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. Two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on the price of the product in a typical Bertrand fashion while producing an identical product. Both firms face the same cost function: C(qA) = 12qA and C(qB) = 12qB, where qA is the output of Firm A and qB is the output of Firm B. (i)...
produce 16000 units of output. What is the cost minimizing combination of capital and labor for this firm? What is it's minimized cost of producing 16000 units of output? 2.2 Problem 2 In a perfectly competitive market all firms (including potential entrants) have a total cost function given by TC(Q) = 100Q - QP + ', where Q is that firm's output. Therefore, each firm's average cost function is AC(Q) = 100-Q+ Qand each firm's marginal cost function is given...
The market demand curve for a pair of duopolists is given as P=38- Q where Q= Q4 + Q2 The constant per unit marginal cost is 14 for firm 1 and 17 for firm 2. Find the equilibrium price, quantity and profit for each firm in both the Cournot model and Bertrand model. (Round your answers to 2 decimal places (e.g., 32.16). Enter zero whenever required.) a) Cournot Equilibrium Price: Equilibrium Quantity for Firm 1: Equilibrium Quantity for Firm 2:...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+ 42. Firm 1's cost function is C (91) = 0, and firm 2 has a cost function C2(92) = 1092- The two firms engage in Cournot competition; they simultaneously choose a quantity and the price adjusts so that the market clears. (a) Formally write firm 1's profit maximization problem (b) Find firm l's best response function. (c) Take as given that firm 2's best...
consider a market with inverse demand curve p=400-4Q. costs per firm are given by C(q)= 16+10q+q^2 a) find the minimum efficient scale output level b) in a competitive market , how many firms will be active in the long-run c) suppose we have a cournot oligopoly with n firms . determine output of each firm and the equilibrium price d) find the long run equilibrium number of firms if the market is a cournot oligopoly and entry occurs until profit...
Consider a homogeneous product industry with inverse demand function p = 36 - 4Q. There are two identical firms in the market, each of them facing the total cost function C = 12q. (a) Firms compete in prices according to the Bertrand model, find the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
The market demand curve for a pair of duopolists is given as P=100- Q where Q= Q1+ Q2. The constant per unit marginal cost is 0 for firm 1 and c for firm 2 where c is some number. Find the equilibrium price, quantity and profit for each firm in the Bertrand model as a function of c a. Equilibrium price equals P=0. Equilibrium quantity is Q1=Q2=10 with both earning Π1=Π2=0. Which one is correct? ---C= 0 OR C>0 b....