Question

Consider the following demand and cost functions; P = 16000 - 4Q Q = Q. + Q: C(0) = 4000Q. C:(02) = 600002

(2) Stackelberg Model. Assume that firm 1 is the leader. (a) (2 points) What is the output for each firm? (b) (3 points) What

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ニ16000-4Q =1600040,-482 Best arpont o /0000-404 11 1600001-4 940, 1000 0-u7 y0000, 16000-80,-o0401-4oo0 7o00 3000 4 fowr /600

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