Homework Answers
2. Answer is er - (T2, PL); yes it is efficient. The Boy 115) 1915 18:12 194: _ it, player A choose tark 2 them big payoff is id & Playe B paj afh's 12 It is a perfect equilibrium. see men - pogone is in less i 2y w
flopettaa A scurding to the situation the days, equillibra of this game is a L (PIR) (p b and (player A plays R with Pro Subility 3/5 player B plays 1 Pi with probability 410) 13. b false The outcome of the game is not Borisoner's elelemna su suth period &
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2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2....
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2....
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player...
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player 2 can choose C, D, E, or F (depending on what player 1 chooses). Player 3 can choose G, H, I, J, K, L, M, or N (depending on what player 1 and 2 choose). Player 1 (P1) goes first, player 2 (P2) goes second, and player 3 (P3) goes third. Payoffs are written as the payoffs for P1, P2, and the for P3....
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0,0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players get...
Player 1 can choose to either play against Player 2 or Player 3. If she chooses...
Player 1 can choose to either play against Player 2 or Player 3. If she chooses to play against Player 2, Player 2 gets to choose between moves X and and Y, and Player 1 picks between moves C and D. If Player 1 chooses to play against Player 3, Player 3 gets a choice between moves S and T, and Player 1 gets to choose between moves E and F. The payoffs for each combination of moves are as...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0, 0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players...
3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1...
3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1 moves twice: Player 1 chooses Enter or Erit, and if she chooses Exit the game ends with payoffs of 2 to player 2 and 0 to player 1. • Player 2 observes player l's choice and will have a choice between Fight or Help if player 1 chose Enter. Choosing Help ends the game with payoffs of 1 to both players. • Finally, player...
1 Consider the following normal-form game. P2 L CR P M (a) Does Pl (player 1)...
1 Consider the following normal-form game. P2 L CR P M (a) Does Pl (player 1) have any dominated strategies? (b) Does P2 (player 2) have any dominated strategies? (c) Suppose l2 beleves that Pl is rational, should P2 believe P1 will ever play B? (d) Suppose player P2 rales out the possibility that Pl plays B, is there a dominated ECON 306 Page 2 of 12 2018 strategy for player P2? (e) Can yoa find any more eliminated strategies...
Consider a game in which Player 1 first selects between L and R. If Player 1...
Consider a game in which Player 1 first selects between L and R. If Player 1 selects L, then players 1 and 2 play a prisoner’s dilemma game represented in the strategic form above. If Player 1 selects R then, Player 1 and 2 play the battle-of-the-sexes game in which they simultaneously and independently choose between A and B. If they both choose A, then the payoff vector is (4,4). If they both choose B, then the payoff vector is...
Elina has to choose between two projects, P1 and P2. If Elina chooses P1 the game is over and the payoffs are 4 to...
Elina has to choose between two projects, P1 and P2. If Elina chooses P1 the game is over and the payoffs are 4 to Elina and 13 to Bonnie. If Elina choose P2, Bonnie observes Elina's choice and then gets to choose between projects P3 and P4. If Elina chooses P2 and Bonnie chooses P3 the payoffs are 2 to Elina and 8 to Bonnie. If Elina chooses P2 and Bonnie chooses P4 the payoffs are 5 and 10 to...
First part: Consider the following two-player game. The players simultaneously and independently announce an integer number...
First part: Consider the following two-player game. The players simultaneously and independently announce an integer number between 1 and 100, and each player's payoff is the product of the two numbers announced. (a) Describe the best responses of this game. How many Nash equilibria does the game have? Explain. (b) Now, consider the following variation of the game: first, Player 1 can choose either to "Stop" or "Con- tinue". If she chooses "Stop", then the game ends with the pair...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0,0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players get...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0, 0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players...
3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1 moves twice: Player 1 chooses Enter or Erit, and if she chooses Exit the game ends with payoffs of 2 to player 2 and 0 to player 1. • Player 2 observes player l's choice and will have a choice between Fight or Help if player 1 chose Enter. Choosing Help ends the game with payoffs of 1 to both players. • Finally, player...
1 Consider the following normal-form game. P2 L CR P M (a) Does Pl (player 1) have any dominated strategies? (b) Does P2 (player 2) have any dominated strategies? (c) Suppose l2 beleves that Pl is rational, should P2 believe P1 will ever play B? (d) Suppose player P2 rales out the possibility that Pl plays B, is there a dominated ECON 306 Page 2 of 12 2018 strategy for player P2? (e) Can yoa find any more eliminated strategies...
Elina has to choose between two projects, P1 and P2. If Elina chooses P1 the game is over and the payoffs are 4 to Elina and 13 to Bonnie. If Elina choose P2, Bonnie observes Elina's choice and then gets to choose between projects P3 and P4. If Elina chooses P2 and Bonnie chooses P3 the payoffs are 2 to Elina and 8 to Bonnie. If Elina chooses P2 and Bonnie chooses P4 the payoffs are 5 and 10 to...
First part: Consider the following two-player game. The players simultaneously and independently announce an integer number between 1 and 100, and each player's payoff is the product of the two numbers announced. (a) Describe the best responses of this game. How many Nash equilibria does the game have? Explain. (b) Now, consider the following variation of the game: first, Player 1 can choose either to "Stop" or "Con- tinue". If she chooses "Stop", then the game ends with the pair...
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