Question

Player 1 can choose to either play against Player 2 or Player 3. If she chooses...

Player 1 can choose to either play against Player 2 or Player 3. If she chooses to play against Player 2, Player 2 gets to choose between moves X and and Y, and Player 1 picks between moves C and D. If Player 1 chooses to play against Player 3, Player 3 gets a choice between moves S and T, and Player 1 gets to choose between moves E and F.

The payoffs for each combination of moves are as follows:

P1 Plays Against P2

P1 Plays Against P3

Moves

Payoffs

P1 Plays C

P2 Plays X

6, 7, 6

P1 Plays C

P2 Plays Y

3, 4, -1

P1 Plays D

P2 Plays X

1, 4, 5

P1 Plays D

P2 Plays Y

5, 8, 0

Moves

Payoffs

P1 Plays E

P3 Plays S

-3, 0, 3

P1 Plays E

P3 Plays T

4, 7, 8

P1 Plays F

P3 Plays S

9, 1, 4

P1 Plays F

P3 Plays T

0, 4, 2

  1. Put the game into a tree in which the players all have perfect information.
  2. Alter the tree so that now after Player 1 makes the choice on who to play against (which all players observe), she and her opponent make their moves simultaneously.
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