Question

1 of 3 (d) Tom and Jerry are trying to decide how to split 400 and have discount factors of 0.8 and 0.5, respectively Jerry gets 240 and Tom gets E160 in the first stage. Show that this outcome dominates the game ending in the third period (e) If bidders' valuations are common knowledge, show that the outcome under a first-price descending bid where such discount factors are common knowledge. In a 3-period alternating-offer game, with making the first offer, show that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is that Jery (Dutch) auction is equivalent to that of a first-price sealed-bid auction. any player's Nash equilibrium bidding strategy is to bid their true valuation. () In a second-price sealed-bid auction with imperfect information about other bidders' valuations, show why il and Aldi) are deciding which side of a large town, East or West, they u operate in only one location. Demand

Part d, e & f

Answer 1