Answer 4.5
If Player 2 chooses L , Player will choose either M or D(because he will get higher payoff if it chooses M or D), If Player 2 chooses C , Player will choose either M or D and If Player 2 chooses R , Player will choose either M. Hence, Player 1 will always choose M whatever Player 2 chooses. Hence Strategy M is a dominant strategies and hence Strategy U and D are strictly dominated strategy and hence both gets eliminated.
As Player 1 will always choose M, we can see from above that Player 2 will get highest payoff if Player 2 chooses R. Hence, Player 2 will choose R and eliminate C and L.
Hence Strategy Profile that survives after iterated elimination is (M , R)
Game Theory Iterated Elimination: In the following normal-form game, which strategy profiles survive iterated elimination of...
2. Consider the following strategic-form game. U P1 M D LCR 6,8 2,6 8,2 8,2 4,4 9,5 8,10 4,6 6,7 Figure 1: A strategic-form game Which strategy profiles survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies?
(20 points) Exercise 3: (Midterm 2018) Consider the following normal-form game, where the pure strategies for Player 1 are U, M, and D, and the pure strategies for Player 2 are L, C, and R. The first payoff in each cell of the matrix belongs to Player 1, and the second one belongs to Player 2. Player 2 IL CR u 6,8 2,6 8,2 Player 1 M 8,2 4,4 9,5 8,10 4,6 6,7 (7) a) Find the strictly dominated (pure)...
survive 1.2. In the following normal-form game, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria? of strictly dominated L CR T 2,0 1,14,2 M 3,4 1,2 2,3 B 1,30,2 3,0
For each of the following normal-form game below, find the rationalizable strategy profiles, using IENBRS, Iterated Elimination of Never a Best Response Strategies. (1)/(2) L C R (3,2) (4,0) (1,1) (2,0) (3,3) (0,0) (1,1) (0,2) (2,3)
Q1 Elimination of strictly-dominated strategies In each of the following two-player games, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly- dominated strategies? What are the Nash equilibria of these games? (a) Player 2 Left 0,2 1,3 2,4 Top Middle Bottom Center 4,3 2,4 1,5 Right 3, 4 2, 3 4,6 Player 1 (b) Player 2 Left 2,4 3,3 4,6 Top Middle Bottom Center 6,5 4,3 5,4 Player 1 Right 5,3 4, 2 2,5
Iterated Iterated elimination of dominated strategies: Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the original game. Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the modified game where players cannot choose any strategy that was eliminated at Step 1. 3 Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the modified game where players cannot choose any strategy that was eliminated at Steps 1 and 2. 4 ... and so on until there are...
Q1 Elimination of strictly-dominated strategies In each of the following two-player games, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly- dominated strategies? Player 2 Lett Center Right Top 0.2 4, 3 3,1 Player1 Middle 1, 2 2,0 2, Bottom 2,4 36 0,3 Player 2 Left Center Right Top 1, 3 ,4 ,2 Player 1 Middle 2,2 2 3,1 Bottom 3, 5 43 1, 4
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Explain under what circumstances the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies outcome is the unique Nash equilibrium. Question is relevant to game theory.
We have answer of question 3. So please solve the question 4 and 5. I need detailed information about them. Could you please answer quickly. Question 3 Find the strategy profiles that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Player 2 M R L 1,3 2,1 2,2 Player 1 D0,2 1,1 Question 4 Can we have a Nash equilibrium in the game in Question 3 where Player 2 chooses M? Explain. Question 5 Check each strategy profile of the...