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Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3

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Part a) strictly dominated those strategies which are dominated by other strategies on the basis of payoffs the pass on receiL M R nash equilibrium (4,3) strategy D for player 1 - L - 2

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