1> For player 2, Y is dominated by X.
For player 1, A is dominated by C
So, the set of Strictly dominated strategy is {A,Y}
2> Rationalizable strategies are those where players are rational and it is a common knowledge that others are. There the strategies which survive after the dominated ones are iteratively eliminated.
After removing A and Y from the game, B dominates D. So, D is removed.
Thus, the set of rationalizable strategies are {B,C,W,X}
3> If B is played. player 2 plays X. If X is played, player 1 plays C. If C is played, player 2 plays W. If W is played, player 1 plays B.
Thus, there is no pure Nash equilibrium in the game
Suppose, player 1 plays pB+(1-p)C, player 2 plays qW+(1-q)X
To remain indifferent, 5q+2(1-q)=3q+4(1-q)
2+3q=4-q
q=0.5
To remain indifferent 6(1-p)=2p+5(1-p)
6-6p=5-3p
p=0.3333
So, the only NE is [1/3B+2/3C,1/2W+1/2X]
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3 2,0 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
2. Find all Nash equilibria (including MSNE) in the following game. Player 2 M Actions L R Player 1,3 2,-2 3,1 1,4 5,0 (Hint: first, show that some action is strictly dominated. Then, find all MSNE in the reduced game).
Find all Nash equilibria of the following game. X Y Z A | 2,2 4,0 1,3 B 1,3 6,0 1,0 0 3,1 3,3 2,2
Find all mixed strategy Nash Equilibria of the following game: X Y Z A 2,2 4,0 1,3 B 1,3 6,0 1,0 C 3,1 3,3 2,2
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 Water 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 ROWENA Wind 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 Fire 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 124 [CH. 4] SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Does either Rowena or Colin have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. (b) Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. Give the order in which the eliminations occur and give the...
4. Consider the following game matrix: LCR T 3 ,1 0,0 4,1 M10, 02, 24, 3 B 7,6 | 1,2 3,1 (a) Find all the strictly dominated (pure) strategies for each player. (b) Find all the weakly dominated (pure) strategies of each player. (c) Does the game has a strict dominant strategy equilibrium?
2. Iterative Deletion of (weakly) Dominated Strategies Consider the following two-player game 2 I c I T 1,1 0,1 3,1 1 M 1,0 2,2 1,3 D 1,3 3,1 2,2 (a) Are there any strictly dominated strategies? Are there any weakly dominated strategies? If so, explain what dominates what and how. (b) After deleting any strictly or weakly dominated strategies, are there any strictly or weakly dominated strategies in the reduced' game? If so, explain what dominates what and how. What...
We have answer of question 3. So please solve the question 4 and 5. I need detailed information about them. Could you please answer quickly. Question 3 Find the strategy profiles that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Player 2 M R L 1,3 2,1 2,2 Player 1 D0,2 1,1 Question 4 Can we have a Nash equilibrium in the game in Question 3 where Player 2 chooses M? Explain. Question 5 Check each strategy profile of the...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F C A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 8,9 8,5 2,8 5,2 C 0,10 7,01,9 2,2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...